Editor's note: For amendments prior to 1961, see L. 1877, p. 46, L. 1885, p. 145, and L. 13, p. 678.

Cross references: For the supreme court, see article 2 of title 13; for judicial departments, see article 3 of title 13; for the court of appeals, see article 4 of 13; for district courts, see article 5 of title 13; for county courts, see article 6 of title 13; for the juvenile court of Denver, see article 8 of title 13; for the probate court of Denver, see article 9 of title 13; for municipal courts, see article 10 of title 13; for distribution of governmental powers, see article III of this constitution.

Am. Jur.2d. See 16A Am. Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 259-274; 20 Am. Jur.2d, Courts, §§ 5, 7, 11-17.

C.J.S. See 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §§ 302-306; 21 C.J.S., Courts, §§ 93-106.

Law reviews. For article, "The District Court", see 4 Den. B. Ass'n Rec. 5 (April 1927). For article, "Colorado and Minimum Judicial Standards", see 18 Dicta 1 (1941). For article, "Progress of the Judiciary Committee's Plan", see 25 Dicta 75 (1948). For article on the Colorado judicial system, see 22 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 142 (1950). For article, "Commitment of Misdemeanants to the Colorado State Reformatory", see 29 Dicta 294 (1952). For article, "The System for Administration of Justice in Colorado", see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 299 (1956). For article, "Juvenile Delinquency in Colorado: The Law's Response to Society's Need", see 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1 (1958). For article, "Colorado's Program to Improve Court Administration", see 38 Dicta 1 (1961). For article, "Qualifications, Selection and Tenure of Judges", see 33 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 449 (1961). For article, "Children in Need: Observations of Practice of the Denver Juvenile Court", see 51 Den. L.J. 337 (1974). For article, "Standing to Sue in Colorado: A State of Disorder", see 60 Den. L.J. 421 (1983). For article, "State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial Restraint", see 63 Den. U. L. Rev. 85 (1986).

This article establishes judicial department of state, designates sundry courts in which the judicial power shall be vested, and gives to them certain jurisdiction and diverse powers. Union Pac. Ry. v. Bowler, 4 Colo. App. 25, 34 P. 940 (1893).

And fixes territorial limits in which courts shall transact business. Dixon v. People ex rel. Elliott, 53 Colo. 527, 127 P. 930 (1912).

The supremacy of supreme court "is to be found, not in the extent of its jurisdiction, or the amount of its business, but in the paramount force and authority of its adjudications,--a force acting directly in controlling, without being controlled by, other tribunals,--an authority operating indirectly, from the respect and deference due to the highest tribunal known to the constitution and the laws". People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929 (1891).

"Courts", in the constitutional sense, are the tribunals established for the purpose of administering justice. Dixon v. People ex rel. Elliott, 53 Colo. 527, 127 P. 930 (1912).

This section clearly recognizes two kinds of courts, viz.: First, those established by and expressly enumerated in the constitution itself; and second, such other courts as the general assembly may at its pleasure from time to time create. People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929 (1891).

This section does not interfere with statutes prescribing mode and manner for performing judicial acts. This section is a usual provision of state constitutions, and has not been held to interfere with statutory regulations prescribing the mode, manner and time for the performance of judicial acts, and the entry of judgments. Terpening v. Holton, 9 Colo. 306, 12 P. 189 (1886).

A citizen has no natural or inalienable right to hearing in supreme court. If the right to such a hearing exists, it must be deduced from some constitutional guaranty. People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929 (1891).

Control of practice of law is judicial function. Questions as to issuing and revoking of licenses to practice law and the terms and conditions thereof, determining what acts do or do not constitute the practice of law, punishments for unlicensed practices, methods to prevent the unlawful practices of law and all other matters pertaining thereto are judicial functions and fall within the powers and duties of the judicial branch of the government made up of our constitutionally created courts, the supreme court, district courts and county courts. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957).

This article grants the Colorado supreme court jurisdiction to regulate and control the practice of law in Colorado. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Grimes, 654 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982).

Nothing in this article signifies that officers therein named, or for which provision is therein made, are county officers. The article covers the subject of the judicial power of the state, creates its courts, or makes provision therefor, and does not purport to relate to either counties or county officers. Dixon v. People ex rel. Elliott, 53 Colo. 527, 127 P. 930 (1912).

Although judiciary has exclusive authority to impose sentences, such sentences must be within the limits determined by the General Assembly which has the exclusive authority to define crimes and impose punishment. People v. Schwartz, 823 P.2d 1386 (Colo. App. 1991).

Section as basis for jurisdiction. People ex rel. Cruz v. Morley, 77 Colo. 25, 234 P. 178 (1925).

Applied in Ross v. Ross, 89 Colo. 536, 5 P.2d 246 (1931); United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. McClelland, 95 Colo. 292, 36 P.2d 164 (1934); State v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 101 Colo. 368, 73 P.2d 997 (1937); People v. Buckles, 167 Colo. 64, 453 P.2d 404 (1968); People v. McKnight, 41 Colo. App. 372, 588 P.2d 886 (1978).

General assembly is specifically empowered to establish other courts. The general assembly is specifically empowered by the constitution to establish other courts or judicial officers, as long as such other courts or judicial officers are jurisdictionally inferior to the supreme court. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455, 444 P.2d 645 (1968).

Subject to certain constitutional limitations. The constitutionally granted power to the general assembly to establish other courts or judicial officers is subject to certain limitations which are themselves embedded in the Colorado constitution. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455, 444 P.2d 645 (1968).

An intermediate court, having appellate and final jurisdiction, can be legally created. Such a court may, by legislative enactment, be clothed with appellate jurisdiction in cases remaining within the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, provided its judgments in such cases are made subject to review by the latter court. In re Constitutionality of Court of Appeals, 15 Colo. 578, 26 P. 214 (1890).

The supreme court is not at liberty to transpose the adverb "only" in section 2 of this article and make the constitution read: "The supreme court only shall have appellate jurisdiction"; while the language as it is written, "shall have appellate jurisdiction only", falls far short of declaring that it shall have such jurisdiction in all cases. This expression operates both as a grant and a limitation; it confers appellate authority, and at the same time forbids the exercise of original jurisdiction, save in the excepted cases; it specifies the kind, not the quantum, of jurisdiction, and is not inconsistent with the lodgment of power in some other court to review finally enumerated classes of cases. People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929 (1891).

Thus general assembly had power to create court of appeals. By this section, the general assembly is authorized to create a court of review, and as there is no express constitutional limitation of the jurisdiction that may be conferred upon such a court thus created, if the act is unconstitutional it must be because the jurisdiction sought to be conferred is by implication prohibited in some degree by other constitutional provisions. People ex rel. Griffith v. Scott, 52 Colo. 59, 120 P. 126 (1911).

And to confer upon such court power to try controversies. Since the constitution authorizes the general assembly to create "other courts", such power necessarily carries with it authority to give the courts created a share in the trial of controversies that would otherwise be disposed of by the tribunals expressly named; moreover, the very words of this section lodge "the judicial power of the state" in the courts that may afterwards be provided by law, as well as in those enumerated by name. People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929 (1891).

However, any court established must be inferior to supreme court. Every tribunal established by statute, whether clothed with original or appellate powers, must, like the trial courts expressly named in the constitution, be inferior to the supreme court, subject to its "superintending control", and guided by its decisions upon questions determined in the exercise of its appellate authority. People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929 (1891).

No other court can, under the constitution, be given final appellate jurisdiction in cases left by law within the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. In re Constitutionality of Court of Appeals, 15 Colo. 578, 26 P. 214 (1890).

The judicial power, both appellate and original, lodged by the constitution in the supreme court, cannot be transferred to another court created by the general assembly in any manner so as to make its decisions and opinions final. This jurisdiction is lodged in "a supreme court". Two such courts with like jurisdiction and powers are not contemplated by the constitution. In re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 8, 9 Colo. 623, 21 P. 471 (1886).

If it were within the legislative power to create another court with equal appellate and original power as the supreme court, the bill would still be obnoxious to section 19 of this article, which provides that all laws relating to courts shall be general and uniform. In re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 8, 9 Colo. 623, 21 P. 471 (1886).

General assembly cannot interfere with existence or supremacy of supreme court; nor can that body alter the nature of its jurisdiction and duties. And it follows of course that, without change in the fundamental law, the general assembly cannot create a court of coordinate final jurisdiction. People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929 (1891).

This section of constitution authorizes creation of superior court of Denver. Darrow v. People ex rel. Norris, 8 Colo. 417, 8 P. 661 (1885).

Statute creating superior court not repealed by enactment of new section. The statute which established the superior court was never inconsistent with the constitutional provisions that judicial power shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, and others. Therefore, the statute was not automatically repealed by enactment of new constitutional provision. People ex rel. Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Colo. 391, 488 P.2d 66 (1971).

Office of police judge, with jurisdiction to enforce town ordinances, is authorized by this section. People v. Curley, 5 Colo. 412 (1880); People v. Jobs, 7 Colo. 475, 4 P. 798, rehearing denied, 7 Colo. 589, 4 P. 1124 (1884).

County court judges as judges of municipal and police courts created by home rule cities. The 1962 judicial amendments envisioned that the county court judges could serve not only as judges of the county court but also as judges of municipal and police courts created under powers of home rule cities. Blackman v. County Court, 169 Colo. 345, 455 P.2d 885 (1969).

Justice courts are not constitutional courts and exist under authority and by permission of the legislative branch of the government. United Sec. Corp. v. Pantex Pressing Mach., Inc., 98 Colo. 79, 53 P.2d 653 (1935).

Elimination of words "justices of the peace" did not repeal statute establishing justices of the peace. The elimination of the words "justices of the peace" from the 1912 amendment to this section can in no sense be construed as a repeal, a limitation or restriction of the early statute establishing justices of the peace. Indeed, the amendment may well be said to have had the prior statute in view, as it specifically provides for "such other courts as may be provided by law", after enumerating certain judicial tribunals as constitutional courts. W.H. Courtright Publishing Co. v. Bray, 67 Colo. 588, 189 P. 30 (1920).

Public utilities commission is not a court. It is charged with the performance of certain executive and administrative duties in the performance of which it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity but has no judicial powers within the meaning of that term as used in the constitution. People v. Swena, 88 Colo. 337, 296 P. 271 (1931).

Applied in People ex rel. Heyer v. Juvenile Court, 75 Colo. 493, 226 P. 866 (1924); Abbott v. People, 91 Colo. 510, 16 P.2d 435 (1932).

Allocation of jurisdiction is matter for legislative determination. The jurisdiction allocated to the courts created by the general assembly pursuant to constitutional authority is a matter for the general assembly to determine. Denver County Court v. Lee, 165 Colo. 455, 439 P.2d 737 (1968); Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970); South Washington Associates v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217 (Colo. 1992).

The constitutional policy seems to have been, not to specify absolutely the extent and boundaries of the jurisdiction of all the courts, but to allow a large legislative discretion, so that the varying demands and the ever-changing necessities of the people may from time to time be adequately provided for. People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929 (1891).

General assembly's authority under this section is exclusive. Where parties to an arbitration agreement purported to allow the court of appeals or the supreme court to conduct a substantive review of the arbitration panel's award, contrary to the controlling statutes, clause was void and unenforceable. South Washington Associates v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217 (Colo. 1992).

Trial courts have jurisdiction to determine federal constitutional questions, and it is their duty to do so by virtue of par. 2 of art. VI, U.S. Const., which provides that the constitution of the United States and all laws made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land and the judges of every state shall be bound thereby and by § 8 of art. XII, Colo. Const., requiring officers to take an oath to support the constitution of the United States and of the state of Colorado, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1913 amendment to this section which provided that the supreme court should have exclusive jurisdiction to determine such matters. People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 P. 146 (1921).

And any attempt to take away this jurisdiction is null and void. When a federal constitutional question is raised in any of the trial courts of Colorado the right is given, and the duty is imposed upon those courts, by that instrument itself, to adjudicate and determine it. That right so given can neither be taken away nor that duty abrogated by the state of Colorado, by constitutional provision or otherwise, and any attempt to do so is null and void. Such pretended constitutional inhibition is no part of the constitution of the state of Colorado, and the judge's oath binding him to the support and enforcement of that instrument has no relation to such void provisions. People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 P. 146 (1921).

A state constitutional provision prohibiting trial courts from passing on constitutional questions takes from a defendant the right of interposing the defense that the act under which he is prosecuted is unconstitutional, and is invalid as violating the "due process of law" clause. People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100, 198 P. 150 (1921).

Provisions providing for review of decisions of supreme court by people are null and void. Decisions of the supreme court upon constitutional questions cannot be reviewed by popular vote of the citizens of Colorado or one of its municipalities, and any pretended constitutional provision of this state assuming to provide such method of review is null and void. Hence, that part of a 1913 amendment to this section providing for the review of decisions of the supreme court by the people is null and void. People v. Western Union Tel. Co., 70 Colo. 90, 198 P. 146 (1921); People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100, 198 P. 150 (1921).

District courts deprived of plenary power by creation of juvenile courts. By constitutional authority conferred upon the general assembly by this section, district courts were permitted to be deprived of their otherwise plenary power to determine causes of the constitutionally specified character by the creation of juvenile courts in certain counties and the vesting of that jurisdiction in them. People ex rel. Lucke v. County Court, 109 Colo. 447, 126 P.2d 334 (1942).

Exercise of jurisdiction not precluded by absence of statutory or constitutional provision. The absence of a statutory or constitutional provision which specifically designates a forum or spells out standards for decision will not preclude exercise of a court's jurisdiction, even where the subject matter would not have been subject to judicial authority at common law. In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981).

Actual controversy between adverse parties must exist if a court is to sua sponte address the constitutionality of a statute. Juvenile court's ruling that statute was unconstitutional was impermissible exercise of judicial authority since the issue was raised on behalf of unidentified parties that were not before the court on court's own motion in order to create a controversy that it then proceeded to decide. In re Tomlinson, 851 P.2d 170 (Colo. 1993).

Judicial power cannot be conferred by consent upon one not clothed therewith in manner designated by law; nor can suitors by consent legalize the effort of such a person to act in place of a judge and perform his official duties. Haverly Invincible Mining Co. v. Howcutt, 6 Colo. 574 (1883).

No authority is given in the constitution, and none could be given by statute, for parties litigant to choose whom they will for the purpose of sitting as a court in the trial of a given cause, and the judge himself cannot cast his "judicial robe upon the shoulders of any man" who might be acceptable to the parties in a particular suit. Haverly Invincible Mining Co. v. Howcutt, 6 Colo. 574 (1883).

And proceedings are not rendered judicial because duties imposed require exercise of discretion. The mere fact that duties are imposed upon officers which require the exercise of judgment and discretion, does not, of itself, render their proceedings conducted in pursuance of their authority, judicial in the sense in which the term is used in the constitution. Am. Sulphur & Mining Co. v. Brennan, 20 Colo. App. 439, 79 P. 750 (1905).

Power to make rules of procedure is right of supreme court. Aside from any common law right, or statutory grant, the power to make rules of procedure is the constitutional right of the Colorado supreme court. Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931).

Under constitution as originally adopted, no part of judicial power of state could be vested in coroner. It is true that this constitution was amended in 1885 so as to permit the general assembly to create new courts, conferring upon that body a large discretion with reference to the jurisdiction that might be given to such courts, but no attempt has since been made to confer judicial power upon coroners in this state. Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Ross-Lewin, 24 Colo. 43, 51 P. 488 (1897).

Applied in Bd. of Comm'rs v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 9 Colo. App. 368, 48 P. 675 (1897); Mervin v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 29 Colo. 169, 67 P. 285 (1901); Ontario Mining Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 86 Colo. 206, 280 P. 483 (1929); Allen v. Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932); Dill v. People, 94 Colo. 230, 29 P.2d 1035 (1934); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Manley, 99 Colo. 153, 60 P.2d 913 (1936); Local 13, Teamsters v. Perry Truck Lines, 106 Colo. 25, 101 P.2d 436 (1940); In re Water Rights, 181 Colo. 395, 510 P.2d 323 (1973).