To determine whether two convictions entered on the same date as part of a single plea agreement arose "out of separate and distinct criminal episodes", it is necessary to determine whether the convictions arose from a series of acts arising from the same criminal episode, such as physical acts that are committed simultaneously or in close sequence, that occur in the same place or closely related places, and that form part of a schematic whole. People v. Jones, 967 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1997).

Convictions may be separate even though sentences concurrent. Separate judgments of convictions may result from the separate charges in question, even though the sentences are made concurrent. People v. Ybarra, 652 P.2d 182 (Colo. App. 1982).

A guilty verdict that has withstood a motion for new trial and for which a defendant has been sentenced can be used as a prior conviction for purposes of bringing an habitual criminal charge against a defendant in conjunction with a later felony charge. People v. District Court, 192 Colo. 351, 559 P.2d 235 (1977).

The error, if any, in admitting a questionable federal conviction was harmless because four other previous felonies were proved. People v. Boehmer, 872 P.2d 1320 (Colo. App. 1993).

This section embraces every felony committed by a defendant here or in a foreign state, and if a felony in the foreign state, it satisfies the statute. The language of this section refutes the contention that all crimes, wherever committed, and regardless of their grade at the situs of the crime must be proven to be felonies if committed within this state. Hahn v. People, 126 Colo. 451, 251 P.2d 316 (1952).

Conviction of a felony in a sister state, even though crime charged is not a felony in Colorado, is sufficient to authorize sentence under this section. A reading of this section admits of no other interpretation. Burns v. People, 148 Colo. 245, 365 P.2d 698 (1961); People v. Swain, 43 Colo. App. 343, 607 P.2d 396 (1979).

It makes no difference for the purposes of enhanced punishment under this section that a previously committed crime is not a felony in Colorado if it is a felony where the conviction was had. People v. Renfrow, 199 Colo. 101, 605 P.2d 915 (1980).

The time as well as the place of commission of a crime should determine its status as a felony under this section. People v. Renfrow, 199 Colo. 101, 605 P.2d 915 (1980).

Focus of this section is on "crime", not conduct, occurring in foreign state. Therefore, the inquiry as to whether a foreign predicate misdemeanor conviction would have been a felony in Colorado is limited to a comparison of the statutes, or, where required, to the operative and material allegations of the charging document. Otherwise the defendant could be subjected to a trial of the foreign matter in the habitual criminal phase at a time and place far removed from the site of the crime. People v. Nguyen, 899 P.2d 352 (Colo. App. 1995) (decided under statute as it existed prior to 1994 amendment to subsection (1)).

Allegation and proof necessary to sustain imposition of enhanced penalty under this section focus upon the entry of judgment against a defendant, not on the defendant's plea or a verdict of guilt. Where the prosecutor charged and proved the entry of judgment for three prior convictions, the trial court erred in ruling that the enhanced penalty could not be imposed. People v. Chavez, 198 Colo. 309, 599 P.2d 261 (1979).

An authenticated copy of the record of former convictions and judgments is prima facie evidence of the convictions and may be used as evidence in a habitual criminal conviction proceeding. People v. Gilmore, 97 P.3d 123 (Colo. App. 2003).

Discretionary reformatory sentence was conviction of a felony. Conviction of the crime of robbery resulting in a sentence to the reformatory rather than to the penitentiary is nevertheless conviction of a felony within the meaning of this section since sentence could have been to the penitentiary notwithstanding the fact that defendant was under the age of 21 years. Martinez v. Tinsley, 142 Colo. 495, 351 P.2d 879 (1960). But see Smalley v. People, 134 Colo. 360, 304 P.2d 902 (1956); Villalon v. People, 145 Colo. 327, 358 P.2d 1018 (1961) (decided under former statute imposing reformatory sentence as a matter of right).

The trial court's ruling that defendant being under 21 years, convicted of a robbery, and subject to sentence to either the reformatory or the penitentiary was guilty of a felony, was correct and within the purview of this section; it does not offend the provisions of § 4 of art. XVIII, Colo. Const. Sandoval v. People, 162 Colo. 416, 426 P.2d 968 (1967).

Conviction in county court not felony. Before a defendant can be adjudged an habitual criminal, he must have had two prior convictions of felony, and a conviction of grand larceny in the county court is not conviction of a felony. Latham v. People, 136 Colo. 252, 317 P.2d 894 (1957).

The increased punishment under this statute is not arbitrary because it can only be imposed after the proof of the additional facts of prior convictions. People v. Thomas, 189 Colo. 490, 542 P.2d 387 (1975).

The recidivist statute does not attempt to resentence a defendant for a prior felony. People v. Thomas, 189 Colo. 490, 542 P.2d 387 (1975).

Sentences imposed under habitual criminal statute supersede those statutorily mandated for specific crimes. People v. Anderson, 43 Colo. App. 178, 605 P.2d 60 (1979).

Rather than imposing a separate sentence for defendant's status, habitual criminal statutes merely substitute a different and more severe sentencing range than the penalty provided for in the criminal statute or statutes which were violated by defendant and which constitute the underlying offense or offenses. The recidivist statute is aimed at habitual criminals and the punishment is for the new crime only, but is heavier if he is an habitual criminal. People v. Early, 692 P.2d 1116 (Colo. App. 1984).

No separate sentence is to be imposed for the habitual criminal adjudication. People v. Reyes, 728 P.2d 349 (Colo. App. 1986).

The sentence to be imposed under this section relates only to the enhancement of punishment of the felony for which defendant is currently charged and convicted. People v. Thomas, 189 Colo. 490, 542 P.2d 387 (1975).

A convicted defendant is not foreclosed from later challenging the enhanced sentence resulting from the habitual criminal charge if, in fact, a prior conviction is reversed. People v. District Court, 192 Colo. 351, 559 P.2d 235 (1977).

In an enhanced sentencing proceeding, the defendant may collaterally attack the constitutional validity of the underlying convictions, but defendant must make a prima facie showing that a prior conviction is invalid in order to challenge the use of that conviction in a later proceeding. People v. Montoya, 640 P.2d 234 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Ball, 813 P.2d 759 (Colo. App. 1990).

Collateral attacks pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c) on infirmities related to adjudication of habitual criminality under this section should be considered under § 16-5-402 (1), limiting the time within which such attacks must be made. People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1994).

Whether the previous convictions were constitutionally procured is an issue which may properly be raised in an habitual offender proceeding. People v. Gonzales, 38 Colo. App. 522, 565 P.2d 945 (1977).

Prior unconstitutional conviction may not be used. A prior conviction obtained in violation of a constitutional right of the accused cannot be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding to support guilt or to enhance punishment. Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1982); People v. Cisneros, 665 P.2d 145 (Colo. App. 1983); People v. Johnson, 699 P.2d 5 (Colo. App. 1984).

Procedure where prior conviction alleged to have been unconstitutionally obtained. In attacking the constitutional validity of a prior conviction in habitual criminal proceedings, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the challenged conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. Once a prima facie showing is made, the conviction is not admissible unless the prosecution establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the conviction was obtained in accordance with the defendant's constitutional rights. Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1982); People v. Johnson, 699 P.2d 5 (Colo. App. 1984); People v. Wade, 708 P.2d 1366 (Colo. 1985); Lacy v. People, 775 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1989); People v. Mogul, 812 P.2d 705 (Colo. App. 1991).

Procedure applied in People v. Reyes, 728 P.2d 349 (Colo. App. 1986).

A mere showing of uncertainty about whether the defendant's constitutional rights were fully protected is not sufficient to support vacating an enhanced penalty which was based on a claim that a guilty plea was unconstitutionally obtained. People v. Ball, 813 P.2d 759 (Colo. App. 1990).

Collateral estoppel not applicable in context of an habitual criminal proceeding to a trial court ruling which merely excludes evidence concerning defendant's status as an habitual criminal and, thus, district court was not barred from considering validity of a plea advisement that was previously found to be invalid for purpose of sentence enhancement in an habitual criminal proceeding. Wright v. People, 690 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1984).

Prior conviction decreed nullity cannot be reaffirmed by defendant. The defendant cannot "reaffirm" the validity of a prior conviction at an habitual offender hearing when the court of appeals has decreed by final judgment that the prior conviction is a nullity. People v. Dugger, 673 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1983).

Proof of habitual criminality through testimonial admissions unconstitutional. Use of defendant's testimonial admissions to prior felony convictions as substantive evidence of his habitual criminality violates due process of law, by unduly burdening defendant's constitutional right to testify in his own defense. People v. Chavez, 632 P.2d 574 (Colo. 1981); People v. Hernandez, 686 P.2d 1325 (Colo. 1984).

The decision in People v. Chavez, is to be given retroactive application. People v. Tafoya, 654 P.2d 1342 (Colo. App. 1982).

If a defendant's guilty plea in a previous conviction was not voluntary and knowing, it was obtained in violation of due process, and a conviction based thereon cannot be used for the purpose of enhancing the punishment for another offense. People v. Gonzales, 38 Colo. App. 522, 565 P.2d 945 (1977).

The admissibility of prior guilty pleas in a habitual criminal hearing turns on whether they meet the constitutional requirements for voluntariness, not whether they satisfy the particular standards of a state's substantive law. Blehm v. People, 817 P.2d 988 (Colo. 1991).

Prior convictions held to have been obtained constitutionally. People v. Chavez, 650 P.2d 1310 (Colo. App. 1982).

Guilty pleas or pleas of nolo contendere which meet the constitutional requirements for voluntariness will be admissible in habitual criminal proceedings even if they do not satisfy more stringent admissibility requirements under another state's substantive law. Blehm v. People, 817 P.2d 988 (Colo. 1991).

If evidence is insufficient to prove that two of defendant's three convictions were separate and distinct, defendant may be resentenced under subsection (1.5). People v. Jones, 967 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1997).

When indigent entitled to transcript of prior proceedings. Although an indigent defendant is entitled to a free transcript of prior proceedings when it is necessary for an effective defense in an enhanced sentencing proceeding, the defendant must make a showing that the furnishing of the transcripts would not be just a vain and useless gesture. People v. Montoya, 640 P.2d 234 (Colo. App. 1981).

Plea of guilty under less severe provisions of section proper. Where a plea of guilty to the substantive charge was made by the defendant with the understanding that the less severe provisions of the habitual criminal act only would be invoked against him, and the trial court approved of such disposition of the case and eliminated from consideration one of the counts of the information, and imposed sentence accordingly, the sentence was valid and a writ of habeas corpus was properly denied. Martinez v. Tinsley, 142 Colo. 495, 351 P.2d 879 (1960).

Indeterminate commitment under the sex offenders act was in lieu of prisoner's sentence under the habitual criminal act, and, therefore, the trial court erred in sentencing him to concurrent terms under the respective statutes. People v. Sanchez, 184 Colo. 379, 520 P.2d 751 (1974).

Sentence imposed under this section was valid. Vigil v. People, 137 Colo. 161, 322 P.2d 320 (1958); Hackett v. Tinsley, 143 Colo. 203, 352 P.2d 799, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 874, 81 S. Ct. 118, 5 L. Ed. 96 (1960).

Where petitioner's sentence under this section cannot be said to be void, he did not seek modification thereof, and there was no showing that he is presently being illegally incarcerated, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was properly denied. Wright v. Tinsley, 148 Colo. 258, 365 P.2d 691 (1961).

Defendant's sentence under habitual criminal statute to a term of 40 to 50 years was not disproportionate to his conduct or grossly excessive where he had been convicted of burglary and aggravated robbery before his present conviction for first-degree burglary. People v. Thomas, 189 Colo. 490, 542 P.2d 387 (1975).

Sentence of 25 years and 4 months is neither cruel or unusual, nor is it disproportionate where defendant was convicted of 3 theft-related felony offenses in 10 years. People v. Nieto, 715 P.2d 1262 (Colo. App. 1985).

The requirement in § 16-11-304 for a definite sentence is also a requirement for any increased sentence imposed under § 16-13-101. Thus, it was proper for a trial court to impose a definite sentence. People v. Chambers, 749 P.2d 984 (Colo. App. 1987).

Reinstatement of prior felony conviction. Where a prior felony conviction has been dismissed from consideration in habitual criminal proceedings and, without consideration of that conviction, the defendant could not be adjudged an habitual criminal, then it is appropriate that the people be entitled to reinstate that conviction subject to proof of authenticity. People v. Vigil, 39 Colo. App. 462, 570 P.2d 13 (1977).

Reinstatement of all charges where defendant was allowed to plead guilty to the wrong habitual criminal charges. Vacating guilty pleas and reinstating all charges, including habitual criminal charges, is appropriate remedy where, as part of a plea agreement to avoid "big" habitual criminal charges, defendant pled guilty to robbery, violent crime, and to two "little" habitual criminal charges. People v. Martinez, 751 P.2d 660 (Colo. App. 1987).

Where defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and was adjudicated a habitual criminal, a subsequent reversal of the adjudication of habitual criminality negated its sentence enhancing effect and required resentencing for the underlying charge since it was not clear from the record that the robbery sentence was imposed independently from the habitual criminal adjudication. When resentencing the trial court could consider all relevant and material factors, including new evidence incorporated in a supplemental presentence report. People v. Watkins, 684 P.2d 234 (Colo. 1984).

Mittimus listing "habitual criminal" as crime may be corrected. Where the mittimus erroneously states "habitual criminal" as the crime for which sentence was imposed the only relief to which petitioner is entitled is a correction of the mittimus to conform to the judgment finding him guilty of aggravated robbery, not to a writ of habeas corpus. Bernard v. Tinsley, 144 Colo. 244, 355 P.2d 1098 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 830, 81 S. Ct. 718, 5 L. Ed.2d 708 (1961).

Habitual criminal act was validly adopted. Ryan v. Tinsley, 316 F.2d 430 (10th Cir.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 375 U.S. 17, 84 S. Ct. 139, 11 L. Ed.2d 46 (1963).

Out-of-state felonies may be the basis for a habitual criminal count and the people need not allege or prove that the crimes the defendant committed would have been felonies if they had been committed in this state. People v. Drake, 785 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1990); People v. Wilczynski, 873 P.2d 10 (Colo. App. 1993); People v. Johnson, 74 P.3d 349 (Colo. App. 2002).

Where both the violent crimes statute and the habitual criminal statute apply, the sentencing provisions of both statutes apply and a judge must impose the defendant's sentences to run consecutively. People v. Pena, 794 P.2d 1070 (Colo. App. 1990).

The sentencing provisions of this section do not preempt other statutory enhancement provisions. People v. Perry, 981 P.2d 667 (Colo. App. 1999).

The provisions of § 18-1-105 (9.7)(a) and (9.7)(b)(XI) which provide that the maximum presumptive range for a class 4 felony shall be increased by two years are not preempted by this section. People v. Perry, 981 P.2d 667 (Colo. App. 1999).

Nothing in this section expressly authorizes trial courts, upon a finding of unusual and extenuating circumstances, to modify crime of violence sentences imposed pursuant to § 18-1-105 (9). People v. Perry, 981 P.2d 667 (Colo. App. 1999).

If a convicted sex offender is subject to both subsection (1.5) and the provisions of the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998, both statutes must be reconciled. In such case, the trial court must impose a prison sentence for an indeterminate term of at least three times the upper limit of the presumptive range for the level of offense committed and a maximum of the sex offender's natural life. People v. Apodaca, 58 P.3d 1126 (Colo. App. 2002).

Where the defendant was convicted of "extraordinary risk of harm" crime and adjudicated as a habitual criminal, trial court properly calculated defendant's sentence by increasing the maximum presumptive range sentence pursuant to § 18-1-105 (9.7) and then multiplying it by three pursuant to subsection (1.5). People v. Hoefer, 961 P.2d 563 (Colo. App. 1998).

The preemptive scope of the habitual criminal statute does not extend so far as to preclude the mandatory consecutive sentencing requirement for multiple crimes of violence arising out of the same incident. People v. Pena, 794 P.2d 1070 (Colo. App. 1990).

The language "three times the maximum of the presumptive range" as used in subsection (1.5) refers only to sentences of less than life imprisonment and thus trial court erred in imposing three terms of life imprisonment without parole for a defendant charged with one count of first degree murder for the killing of a single victim. People v. Holloway, 973 P.2d 721 (Colo. App. 1998).

Defendant's drug conviction, as both an habitual criminal under this section and as a special drug offender under a prior version of § 18-18-407, should have resulted in a prison sentence determined by the additional aggravating circumstances of the special drug offender section. By using a formula in the special drug offender section that increases the sentence length without reclassifying the offense for which it is imposed, the legislature requires the application of two different sentence enhancing provisions when the special offender is also an habitual criminal, independently mandating sentence enhancement for different aggravating circumstances. Martinez v. People, 69 P.3d 1029 (Colo. 2003).

Neither this section nor § 18-18-407 purports to limit the effect of additional aggravation or to place an upper limit on the ultimate sentence for a defendant to whom its provisions apply. Martinez v. People, 69 P.3d 1029 (Colo. 2003).

Statute as basis for jurisdiction. See Munsell v. People, 122 Colo. 402, 222 P.2d 615 (1950); Hackett v. People, 158 Colo. 304, 406 P.2d 331 (1965); Silva v. People, 170 Colo. 152, 459 P.2d 285 (1969); Mingo v. People, 171 Colo. 474, 468 P.2d 849 (1970); People v. Hill, 182 Colo. 253, 512 P.2d 257 (1973).

The presumptive range for a class 6 felony could not be doubled and then the sentence quadrupled because the defendant was also considered an habitual offender. The defendant was convicted of stalking while the defendant was on parole from prison. The stalking offense qualified the defendant as an habitual offender. Stalking is a class 6 felony. Section 18-1-105 requires the doubling of the presumptive range of the conviction for offenses that occur while on parole. Subsection (2) requires the quadrupling of offenses committed by habitual offenders. Subsection (2), however, does not authorize the quadrupling of a sentence that is already increased. People v. Bastian, 981 P.2d 203 (Colo. App. 1998).

Court required to apply both § 18-18-405 and this section. A second violation of § 18-18-405 for unlawful distribution and sale of a schedule II controlled substance increases the offense to a class 2 felony. If defendant has been convicted of three previous felonies, subsection (2) requires court to sentence defendant to four times the maximum of the presumptive range for a class 2 felony. People v. Cordova, 199 P.3d 1 (Colo. App. 2007).

Applied in People v. Enlow, 135 Colo. 249, 310 P.2d 539 (1957); Hatch v. Tinsley, 143 Colo. 170, 352 P.2d 670 (1960); Jaramillo v. District Court, 173 Colo. 459, 480 P.2d 841 (1971); People v. Marquez, 190 Colo. 255, 546 P.2d 482 (1976); People v. Keelin, 39 Colo. App. 124, 565 P.2d 957 (1977); People v. Smith, 195 Colo. 404, 579 P.2d 1129 (1978); People v. Lake, 195 Colo. 454, 580 P.2d 788 (1978); Hampton v. District Court, 199 Colo. 104, 605 P.2d 54 (1980); People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980); People v. Self, 200 Colo. 406, 615 P.2d 693 (1980); People v. McKnight, 200 Colo. 486, 617 P.2d 1178 (1980); People v. Cabral, 629 P.2d 575 (Colo. 1981); People v. Shaver, 630 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1981); People v. Trujillo, 631 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1981); People v. Henry, 631 P.2d 1122 (Colo. 1981); People v. Hotopp, 632 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1981); People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 632 P.2d 1009 (Colo. 1981); People v. Wiedemer, 641 P.2d 289 (Colo. App. 1981); Massey v. People, 649 P.2d 1070 (Colo. 1982); People v. Hale, 654 P.2d 849 (Colo. 1982); People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1983); People ex rel. Faulk v. District Court ex rel. County of Fremont, 673 P.2d 998 (Colo. 1983); People v. Akers, 746 P.2d 1381 (Colo. App. 1987); People v. Daniels, 973 P.2d 641 (Colo. App. 1998); People v. Copeland, 976 P.2d 334 (Colo. App. 1998), aff'd on other grounds, 2 P.3d 1283 (Colo. 2000).