(B) Sexual assault in the second degree, as defined in section 18-3-403, as it existed prior to July 1, 2000;

(II) (A) Unlawful sexual contact, as defined in section 18-3-404; or

(B) Sexual assault in the third degree, as defined in section 18-3-404, as it existed prior to July 1, 2000;

(III) Child abuse, as defined in section 18-6-401 (7) (a) (V);

(IV) Second and all subsequent violations of a protection order as defined in section 18-6-803.5 (1.5) (a.5); and

(V) Misdemeanor failure to register as a sex offender, as described in section 18-3-412.5.

(4) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, any person who attempts to commit, conspires to commit, or commits against an elderly person any misdemeanor set forth in part 4 of article 4 of this title, part 1, 2, 3, or 5 of article 5 of this title, or article 5.5 of this title shall be required to pay a mandatory and substantial fine within the limits permitted by law. However, all moneys collected from the offender shall be applied in the following order: Costs for crime victim compensation fund pursuant to section 24-4.1-119, C.R.S.; surcharges for victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund pursuant to section 24-4.2-104, C.R.S.; restitution; time payment fee; late fees; and any other fines, fees, or surcharges. For purposes of this subsection (4), an "elderly person" or "elderly victim" means a person sixty years of age or older.

(5) Every sentence entered under this section shall include consideration of restitution as required by part 6 of this article and by article 18.5 of title 16, C.R.S.

(6) For a defendant who is convicted of assault in the third degree, as described in section 18-3-204, the court, in addition to any fine the court may impose, shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment of at least six months, but not longer than the maximum sentence authorized for the offense, as specified in this section, which sentence shall not be suspended in whole or in part, if the court makes the following findings on the record:

(a) The victim of the offense was pregnant at the time of commission of the offense; and

(b) The defendant knew or should have known that the victim of the offense was pregnant.

(c) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2003, p. 2163, § 4, effective July 1, 2003.)

Source: L. 2002: Entire article added with relocations, p. 1413, § 2, effective October 1. L. 2003: (3)(b)(IV) amended, p. 1014, § 22, effective July 1; (6)(b) and (6)(c) amended, p. 2163, § 4, effective July 1; (1.5)(b) amended, p. 1624, § 44, effective August 6. L. 2004: (3)(a) amended, p. 634, § 3, effective August 4. L. 2005: (1.7) added, p. 1009, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2007: (1) amended, p. 557, § 4, effective April 16. L. 2008: (1.7)(b) and (4) amended, p. 1890, § 55, effective August 5. L. 2009: (1.5) amended, (HB 09-1120), ch. 305, p. 1650, § 2, effective July 1.

Editor's note: (1) This section is similar to former § 18-1-106 as it existed prior to 2002.

(2) Section 4 of chapter 305, Session Laws of Colorado 2009, provides that the act amending subsection (1.5) applies to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2009.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2003 act amending subsections (6)(b) and (6)(c), see section 1 of chapter 340, Session Laws of Colorado 2003.

Am. Jur.2d. See 21 Am. Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 19, 29.

C.J.S. See 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 9, 11.

Law reviews. For note, "Comment: Constitutional Law -- Symbolic Speech -- Colorado Flag Desecration Statute", see 48 Den. L. J. 451 (1971). For article, "Criminal Prosecutions under the Colorado Securities Act", see 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 233 (1976).

Annotator's note. Since § 18-1.3-501 is similar to § 18-1-106 as it existed prior to the 2002 relocation of certain criminal sentencing provisions, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.

Misdemeanor defined. Since felonies are defined in the constitution to be offenses punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, it follows that misdemeanors are violations of the public laws not thus punishable. City of Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo. 94, 20 P. 1 (1888) (decided under G.S. § 689).

A crime carrying a possible penitentiary sentence is a felony while a crime punishable by fine or imprisonment in county jail is a misdemeanor. People v. Green, 734 P.2d 616 (Colo. 1987).

Misdemeanor sentence in conjunction with felony sentence. A court may not sentence an adult offender 21 years of age or older to the department of corrections for a misdemeanor conviction unless such defendant has already been sentenced to the department for a felony and the misdemeanor sentence is made expressly concurrent with the felony sentence. People v. Green, 734 P.2d 616 (Colo. 1987).

Any consecutive sentence imposed on such offender for a misdemeanor conviction must be served in the county jail. People v. Green, 734 P.2d 616 (Colo. 1987); People v. Battle, 742 P.2d 952 (Colo. App. 1987).

Because defendant's misdemeanor sentence expired while he was being held by the corrections department on felony conviction, trial court improperly altered judgment and mittimus to require defendant to serve his misdemeanor time consecutively with his felony term. People v. Battle, 742 P.2d 952 (Colo. App. 1987).

Absent some fault on defendant's part, defendant was entitled to serve his misdemeanor sentence in uninterrupted manner, and mistaken transfer of defendant, by sheriff, to corrections department on subsequently imposed sentence for felony conviction should not have suspended running of defendant's misdemeanor sentence. People v. Battle, 742 P.2d 952 (Colo. App. 1987).

Credit required for presentence confinement. A sentencing judge is constitutionally required to give an indigent defendant credit for time served in presentence confinement, even where the total of the presentence confinement and the sentence imposed after trial is less than the maximum sentence allowed for the offense. Godbold v. Wilson, 518 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Colo. 1981).

No equal protection violation inherent in mandatory sentencing provision as applicable to a conviction for misdemeanor offense of third degree assault on an on-duty peace officer. Sentence not more severe than that for the felony offense of second degree assault, and four-year sentence to department of corrections with possibility of probation after four months was determined to be more harsh than a sentence of two years and one day in a county jail with possibility of home detention. People v. Thompson, 942 P.2d 1242 (Colo. App. 1996).

Establishment of more severe penalty for third degree assault of an on-duty peace officer than for conviction of reckless manslaughter or vehicular assault on a victim who is not a peace officer does not constitute violation of equal protection clause. The former punishes an act that has a greater social impact, which is reasonably related to the sentence. People v. Thompson, 942 P.2d 1242 (Colo. App. 1996).

Applied in United States v. Dunn, 545 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1976); People v. Storey, 191 Colo. 546, 554 P.2d 694 (1976); People v. Lobato, 192 Colo. 357, 559 P.2d 224 (1977); Perea v. District Court, 199 Colo. 27, 604 P.2d 25 (1979); People v. Knaub, 624 P.2d 922 (Colo. App. 1980); People v. Martinez, 628 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1981); People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 632 P.2d 1009 (Colo. 1981); Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1225, 103 S. Ct. 1232, 75 L. Ed.2d 466 (1983); People v. Dunoyair, 660 P.2d 890 (Colo. 1983); People v. Giles, 662 P.2d 1073 (Colo. 1983); People v. Clary, 950 P.2d 654 (Colo. App. 1997).