Former § 13-80-106 held to apply to federal discrimination action. McKinney v. Armco Recreational Prods., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 464 (D. Colo. 1976).

In an action based on federal civil rights law, court applied period of limitations of this section. Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966); Merrigan v. Affiliated Bankshares of Colo., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1408 (D. Colo. 1991), aff'd, 956 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 823, 113 S. Ct. 76, 121 L.Ed.2d 40 (1992); Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475 (10th Cir. 1994).

The applicable statute of limitations for a §1983 action, even one asserted against a law enforcement officer, is the two-year limitation period established under subsection (1)(g). Nieto v. State, 952 P.2d 834 (Colo. App. 1997), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).

Former § 13-80-108 applied to actions under section 10(b) of the federal Securities Exchange Act since there is no federal statute of limitations on these actions. Laymon v. McComb, 524 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Colo. 1981).

There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to provisions of sections 10(b) and 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933. Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir, 1980).

Former § 13-80-108 applied to civil claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Victoria Oil Co. v. Lancaster Corp., 587 F. Supp. 429 (D. Colo. 1984).

Statute of limitations questions may be appropriately resolved on rule 12 (b), F.R.C.P. motion. Aldrich v. McCulloch Props., Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).

Continuing violation of civil rights statute not barred. Alleged discrimination in writing physical damage insurance, a violation of the civil rights statute, was a continuing violation when the policy was renewed in 1971 and 1972, and the statute of limitations contained in this section did not bar the claim based on such discrimination. Ben v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Colo. 1974).

Neither subsection (1)(a) nor subsection (1)(g) applies to a claim under § 43 (a) of the federal Lanham Act. Instead, Colorado's three-year statute of limitations for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, and deceit, § 13-80-101 (c), governs such claims. Full Draw Prods. v. Easton Sports, Inc., 85 F. Supp.2d 1001 (D. Colo. 2000).

Subsection (1)(h) applies to all actions against governmental entities, regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought. Bad Boys of Cripple Creek Mining Co. v. City of Cripple Creek, 996 P.2d 792 (Colo. App. 2000).

A claim for inverse condemnation against a city is a civil action against a governmental entity and is governed by subsection (1)(h). Bad Boys of Cripple Creek Mining Co. v. City of Cripple Creek, 996 P.2d 792 (Colo. App. 2000).

The two-year limitation period of subsection (1)(h) for claims to be brought against a governmental entity is not applicable to the contract claims brought by employees and former employees against a city. To do so would allow a governmental entity to bring a contract claim against a nongovernmental entity within a three-year or longer period while a nongovernmental entity would be required to bring a similar claim against a governmental entity within a two-year period. Fishburn v. City of Colo. Springs, 919 P.2d 847 (Colo. App. 1995).

The six-year limitation period of § 13-80-103.5 (1)(a) applies even against a governmental entity to recover a liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money due. Fishburn v. City of Colo. Springs, 919 P.2d 847 (Colo. App. 1995).

Negligence action against a city based on respondeat superior is not barred under subsection (1)(h) even though the underlying negligence action against the city's employee is barred under § 13-80-103 (1)(c). Gallegos v. City of Monte Vista, 976 P.2d 299 (Colo. App. 1998).

Annotator's note. Since § 13-80-102 (1)(i) is similar to § 13-80-108 as it existed prior to the 1986 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this paragraph (i).

This section is the general statute of limitations applying to all actions or proceedings for which a special period is not provided. Bd. of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund v. Koman, 133 Colo. 598, 298 P.2d 737 (1956).

When damages being apportioned under the Workers' Compensation Act arise from settlement of a tort case, and the apportionment case is a separate cause of action, the act does not govern the time frame and conditions under which the offset must be determined. Accordingly, the two-year catch-all statute of limitations, pursuant to subsection (1)(i), applies. Harrison v. Pinnacol Assurance, 107 P.3d 969 (Colo. App. 2004).

Claims for disability retirement benefits. The statute of limitations in former § 13-80-108 (1)(b) (now this paragraph (i)) governed cases involving claims for disability retirement benefits from the public employees' retirement association in the absence of a special statute of limitations in the act which provided for such claims. Flanigan v. Pub. Employees' Retirement Ass'n, 191 Colo. 198, 551 P.2d 702 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1068, 97 S. Ct. 799, 50 L. Ed.2d 786 (1977).

This section governs time period in which to file for pensions. The general assembly has not enacted a special limitation on the time for filing pension claims, hence, this section governs. Bd. of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund v. Koman, 133 Colo. 598, 298 P.2d 737 (1956).

The right to receive a pension may be barred by this section. The right to receive a pension is a very different right from the right to receive payment once the basic right to receive the pension itself has been determined. Once the right to receive a pension has been determined, then the receipt of the pension is a continuing one. The basic or primary right (to receive the pension) is not a continuing one and may be barred by laches or by a statute of limitations. Bd. of Trustees of Policemen's Pension Fund v. Koman, 133 Colo. 598, 298 P.2d 737 (1956).

This paragraph governs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. The two-year residual statute is best suited to govern actions that confer a general remedy for injuries to personal rights, and, therefore, this paragraph applies to civil rights actions under § 1983. Arvia v. Black, 722 F. Supp. 644 (D. Colo. 1989); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1993); Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475 (10th Cir. 1994).

This section applies to personal actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as such claims are subject to this state's residual statute of limitation. Dillingham v. Univ. of Colo. Bd. of Regents, 790 P.2d 851 (Colo. App. 1989); Riel v. Reed, 760 F. Supp. 852 (D. Colo. 1990); Stump v. Gates, 777 F. Supp. 808 (D. Colo. 1991); Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1993).

The two-year statute of limitations applies to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Siblerud v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 896 F. Supp. 1506 (D. Colo. 1995).

Malicious prosecution claims under § 1983 do not accrue until the underlying criminal convictions are terminated in the plaintiff's favor because a plaintiff neither knows nor has reason to know of an injury that constitutes the basis of a claim until such termination. Allen v. City of Aurora, 892 P.2d 333 (Colo. App. 1994).

Action for partnership accounting falls under two-year period of limitations. No statute of limitations specifically addresses an action for partnership accounting. Tafoya v. Perkins, 932 P.2d 836 (Colo. App. 1996).