42-2-119. Notices - change of address or name.

(1) (a) Whenever any person, after applying for or receiving a driver's license or motor vehicle registration number, moves from the address named in such application or in the license or registration issued to such person or when the name of the licensee is changed, such person shall, within thirty days, notify the department in writing of such person's old and new address and the number of any license or registration held by such person. A licensee who changes his or her name shall, within thirty days, apply in person to renew such license pursuant to section 42-2-118 and in compliance with sections 42-2-107 and 42-2-305.

(b) Repealed. / (Deleted by amendment, L. 2005, p. 645, § 11, effective May 27, 2005.)

(2) All notices and orders required to be given to any licensee or registered owner under the provisions of the motor vehicle laws shall be in writing; and, if mailed, postpaid by first-class mail, to him or her at the last-known address shown by the records kept by the department pursuant to this article. Such mailing shall be sufficient notice in accord with the motor vehicle laws. Any notice or order of the department mailed first-class under the provisions of this title creates a presumption for administrative purposes that such notice or order was received if the department maintains a copy of the notice or order and maintains a certification that the notice or order was deposited in the United States mail by an employee of the department. Evidence of a copy of the notice mailed to the last-known address of the licensee as shown by the records kept by the department pursuant to this article and a certification of mailing by a department employee, or evidence of delivery of notice in person to the last-known address of the licensee as shown by the records kept by the department pursuant to this article, or evidence of personal service upon the licensee or upon any attorney appearing on the licensee's behalf of the order of denial, cancellation, suspension, or revocation of the license by the executive director of the department, or by the executive director's duly authorized representative, is prima facie proof that the licensee received personal notice of said denial, cancellation, suspension, or revocation.

(3) Any person who violates subsection (1) of this section commits a class B traffic infraction.

Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2126, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 98: (1) amended, p. 1102, § 23, effective June 1. L. 99: (1)(b) amended, p. 996, § 2, effective May 29. L. 2000: (2) amended, p. 1640, § 24, effective June 1. L. 2005: (1) and (2) amended, p. 645, § 11, effective May 27; (1)(b) repealed, p. 1172, § 6, effective August 8.

Editor's note: (1) This section was formerly numbered as 42-2-117 and the former section 42-2-119 was relocated to section 42-2-122.

(2) Amendments to subsection (1)(b) by Senate Bill 05-047 and House Bill 05-1107 were harmonized.

Annotator's note. Since § 42-2-119 is similar to § 42-2-117 as it existed prior to the 1994 amending of title 42 as enacted by SB 94-1, relevant cases construing that provision have been included with the annotations to this section.

Constitutionality. The notification provisions of Colorado's traffic code are no more burdensome on nonresidents than residents and do not treat similarly situated classes of drivers differently. Accordingly, a nonresident driver is not denied equal protection of the laws by these provisions. Klingbeil v. State, Dept. of Rev., 668 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1983).

The methods used to notify purported nonresident traffic offenders are not so unconstitutionally deficient as to violate due process rights. Klingbeil v. State, Dept. of Rev., 668 P.2d 930 (Colo. 1983).

Conviction under this section does not constitute an "offense committed while operating a motor vehicle" for purposes of § 42-2-130. Lathe v. State, 691 P.2d 356 (Colo. App. 1984).

There is no requirement that the order of suspension be sent to the licensed driver or be received by him. People v. Neal, 191 Colo. 302, 552 P.2d 508 (1976).

Term "registered mail" includes certified mail. There is nothing in context of subsection (2) which requires that the term registered mail not be construed to include certified mail. Tobias v. State, 41 Colo. App. 444, 586 P.2d 669 (1978).

No evidence of actual notice required when notice is not of final action. Notice by certified mail of plaintiff's driver's license revocation hearing under the former version of the implied consent law is sufficient under this statute. Ault v. Dept. of Rev., 697 P.2d 24 (Colo. 1985).

Applied in People v. Lessar, 629 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1981); People v. Lesh, 668 P.2d 1362 (Colo. 1983).