It is not necessary in an action under this section to show negligence on part of the railroad company in causing the fire. Union Pac. Ry. v. Arthur, 2 Colo. App. 159, 29 P. 1031 (1892).

The doctrine of contributory negligence cannot be invoked by the defendant in an action under this section. Union Pac. Ry. v. Arthur, 2 Colo. App. 159, 29 P. 1031 (1892); Union Pac. D. & G. Ry. v. Williams, 3 Colo. App. 526, 34 P. 731 (1893).

Allegations as to negligence state a cause of action under this section. Denver & R. G. R. R. v. United States, 241 F. 614 (8th Cir. 1917).

Under this section an unaccepted offer to compromise is not admissible in evidence. Denver, T. & G. R. R. v. De Graff, 2 Colo. App. 42, 29 P. 664 (1892).

It is the duty of the court to nonsuit where the evidence does not warrant a verdict for the plaintiff. Tripp v. Fiske, 4 Colo. 24 (1877); Sullivan v. Chrysolite Silver Mining Co., 21 F. 892 (8th Cir. 1884); Union Pac. Ry. v. Sternberg, 13 Colo. 141, 21 P. 1021 (1889); Stratton v. Union Pac. Ry., 7 Colo. App. 126, 42 P. 602 (1895).

Verdict based on incompetent evidence should be set aside. Where there is no competent evidence upon which a verdict could have been predicated, and where it must have been the result of prejudice, it should be set aside. Denver, T. & G. R. R. v. De Graff, 2 Colo. App. 42, 29 P. 664 (1892).

Evidence as to condition of engine is admissible. In an action against a railroad company to recover damages for property destroyed by fire, testimony as to the condition of an engine belonging to defendant and which was shown to have passed on the track close to the place where the fire originated a few minutes before its discovery, by a witness who examined the engine a week or two weeks after the fire, is admissible and its exclusion is error. Crissey & Fowler Lumber Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 17 Colo. App. 275, 68 P. 670 (1902).

Where engine is identified, evidence as to other engines causing fires is inadmissible. In an action against a railroad company to recover damages for property destroyed by fire, where the only engine that could have set the fire was identified, evidence of the setting out of fires at other times and places by other engines belonging to defendant should be excluded. Crissey & Fowler Lumber Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 17 Colo. App. 275, 68 P. 670 (1902).

The fact of the origin of the fire, like any other material fact, should be established. Denver, T. & G. R. R. v. De Graff, 2 Colo. App. 42, 29 P. 664 (1892); Crissey & Fowler Lumber Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 17 Colo. App. 275, 68 P. 670 (1902).

The evidence required to establish the origin of a fire must be direct and connect the fire with the operation of the railroad, or the circumstances must be such as to preclude all probability of the fire having originated in any other way. Stratton v. Union Pac. Ry., 7 Colo. App. 126, 42 P. 602 (1895). See Denver, T. &. G. R. R. v. De Graff, 2 Colo. App. 42, 29 P. 664 (1892); Denver & R. G. R. R. v. Morton, 3 Colo. App. 155, 32 P. 345 (1893).

Considerable latitude is allowed in introducing testimony. From the nature and circumstances of cases under this section considerable latitude must be allowed in the introduction of testimony, and in the drawing of inferences as to the origin of the fire. Union P. R. R. v. Jones, 9 Colo. 379, 12 P. 516 (1886); Union Pac. Ry. v. De Busk, 12 Colo. 294, 20 P. 752 (1888).

Juries should not be allowed to infer or presume origin of fire. In cases of this kind, juries should not be allowed to infer or presume, for want of positive proof to the contrary, that the fire was communicated by the operating of the railroad. Denver, T. & G. R. R. v. De Graff, 2 Colo. App. 42, 29 P. 664 (1892).

Juries may infer or presume origin of fire where the evidence was sufficient to warrant the inference that the fire was caused by the defendant's passing train because several witnesses testified in substance to the springing up of the fire immediately upon the passing of the train, and that there was no fire on the premises before, and no other apparent cause for the fire. Union Pac. Ry. v. De Busk, 12 Colo. 294, 20 P. 752 (1888); Cyle v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 37 Colo. 298, 86 P. 1010 (1906).

Sufficient evidence rebuts probability of fire originating in any other manner. While the jury, within certain limits, may be left to infer the fact from the circumstances proved, such proof should be sufficient to rebut the probability of the fire having originated in any other manner. Denver, T. & G. R. R. v. De Graff, 2 Colo. App. 42, 29 P. 664 (1892); Crissey & Fowler Lumber Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 17 Colo. App. 275, 68 P. 670 (1902).

The fact that a fire burned along the line of a railway is not evidence that it was caused by the railroad company. Denver & R. G. R. R. v. Morton, 3 Colo. App. 155, 32 P. 345 (1893).

The fact that railroad aided in putting out fire is not evidence that it was caused by the railroad company. Acts which follow an injury cannot be proven in civil actions for the purpose of establishing an antecedent negligence. That a railroad company aided in putting out a fire burning along its track does not tend to establish the fact that it caused the fire. Denver & R. G. R. R. v. Morton, 3 Colo. App. 155, 32 P. 345 (1893).

The insurer is not to be subrogated to rights of the insured. Any contract to the contrary, or an assignment by the insured to the insurer, in the policy, of the former's right of action, is without effect. Rhinehart v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 61 Colo. 369, 158 P. 149 (1916).

Railroad cannot escape liability because insurer is also liable. The railroad company cannot escape its statutory liability because the owner has seen fit to contract and pay for indemnity against loss by fire from another source, and upon account of his close proximity to the railroad, probably having paid a higher rate than otherwise. In such cases all the authorities are to the effect that unless otherwise provided by statute the insurance feature is no defense to the railroad company. Rhinehart v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 61 Colo. 369, 158 P. 149 (1916).

The owner of the property damaged or destroyed recovers his loss in full, though he has received the insurance money. Rhinehart v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 61 Colo. 369, 158 P. 149 (1916).

The question of double payment to the owner is a matter purely between the insured and the insurer. The contracts of the appellants for the insurance of their property, with the insurance companies, and their subsequent conduct in relation thereto, are matters in which the wrong-doer had no concern, and which do not affect the measure of its liability. Rhinehart v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 61 Colo. 369, 158 P. 149 (1916).

The time fixed by this section is a condition of the right to sue at all, and a complaint which fails to state that the action was brought within that time fails to state a cause of action and is subject to demurrer. Rhinehart v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 61 Colo. 369, 158 P. 149 (1916); Denver & R. G. R. R. v. United States, 241 F. 614 (8th Cir. 1917).

Failure to bring action within two years acts as limitation of the liability itself. The statute provides that suit must be brought within two years, and we think a failure to bring the suit within the time prescribed by the statute acts as a limitation of the liability itself, and in this respect differs from the ordinary statutes of limitation which affect the remedy only. Denver & R. G. R. R. v. United States, 241 F. 614 (8th Cir. 1917).

Meaning of "accrues". The word "accrues" is employed in different ways. It was evidently the intent of the general assembly to use it in this section in its ordinary sense, which would mean any right that had arisen, that is, was in existence before the passage of the law. British Am. Assurance Co. v. Colo. & S. Ry., 52 Colo. 589, 125 P. 508 (1912).