(15) "Rule" means the whole or any part of every agency statement of general applicability and future effect implementing, interpreting, or declaring law or policy or setting forth the procedure or practice requirements of any agency. "Rule" includes "regulation".

(16) "Rule-making" means agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.

(17) "Sanction" includes the whole or any part of any agency prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of any person; withholding of relief; imposition of any form of penalty or fine; destruction, taking, seizure, barring access to, or withholding of property; assessment of damages; reimbursement; restitution; compensation; costs; charges or fees; requirement; revocation or suspension of a license or the prescription or requirement of terms, conditions, or standards of conduct thereunder; or other compulsory or restrictive action.

(18) "Small business" means a business with fewer than five hundred employees.

Source: L. 59: p. 158, § 1. CRS 53: § 3-16-1. C.R.S. 1963: §3-16-1. L. 67: p. 300, § 1. L. 69: p. 81, § 1. L. 76: (4) amended and (6.5) added, p. 582, § 14, effective May 24. L. 79: (3.5) added and (12) amended, pp. 842, 843, §§ 1, 1, effective May 26. L. 81: (1) amended, p. 1133, § 1, effective June 6. L. 83: (3) amended, p. 962, § 7, effective July 1, 1984. L. 87: (6) amended, p. 961, § 64, effective March 13. L. 90: (12) amended, p. 447, § 8, effective April 18. L. 93: (6.2) added, p. 1325, § 1, effective June 6. L. 2002: (3) amended, p. 586, § 6, effective May 24. L. 2003: (5.5) and (18) added, p. 2370, § 2, effective August 6.

Law reviews. For article, "One Year Review of Constitutional and Administrative Law", see 38 Dicta 154 (1961). For note, "Colorado's Ombudsman Office", see 45 Den. L.J. 93 (1968). For article, "A Review of Recent Activity in Colorado Water Law", see 47 Den. L.J. 181 (1970). For comment, "Standing of State Political Subdivisions to Challenge State Agency Rulings Under the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act", see 53 Den. L. J. 437 (1976).

The director of the department of revenue is an "agency" for purposes of this act. Farmers Cafe v. State Dept. of Rev., 752 P.2d 1064 (Colo. App. 1988).

Board of chiropractic examiners is an "agency" of the state and not subject to civil rights claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Stjernholm v. Colorado Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs, 820 P.2d 1166 (Colo. App. 1991).

State board for community colleges and occupational education is an "agency" of the state and no action for damages may be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nat'l Camera, Inc. v. Sanchez, 832 P.2d 960 (Colo. App. 1991).

Board of county commissioners is an "agency". Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 470 P.2d 861 (1970).

Labor department's division of employment must also be deemed an "agency", as that term is defined in this section. City of Aurora v. Indus. Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 132, 609 P.2d 129 (1980).

Air pollution (now air quality) control commission is an "agency" under this section and is subject to the provisions of the state administrative procedure act. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

University of Colorado not an agency. Since the university of Colorado is neither a rule-making nor licensing agency, the administrative procedure act doesn't apply to it expressly or by implication. Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo. 1966).

Community college board not an agency. Pursuant to subsection (3) of this section and § 24-4-106, decisions by the state board for community colleges and occupational education and by a college president are excluded from judicial review. Van Pelt v. State Bd. for Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765 (1978).

"Aggrieved" parties defined. Those whose activities are exactly those to which a particular regulation apply, and who will be adversely affected by an application of the regulation, are "aggrieved" parties, with standing to seek judicial review of the regulation. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

"Aggrieved" parties under health insurer conversion statute included a policyholder of the corporation to be converted and a coalition of nonprofit organizations that could be adversely affected if the entity established to receive the consideration under this section were not sufficiently funded. Hawes v. Colo. Div. of Ins., 32 P.3d 571 (Colo. App. 2001).

"Party" seeking review need not file alternative regulation. Status as a "party" in seeking judicial review of agency action does not require that one have filed an alternative to a proposed regulation. CF&I Steel Corp. v. Colo. Air Pollution Control Comm'n, 199 Colo. 270, 610 P.2d 85 (1980).

County not included in definition of "party". A county, as an arm of the state board of social services, has no rights or privileges so far as its statutory duties are concerned and hence does not come within the definition of "party". Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bd. of Soc. Servs., 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244 (1974).

Board of county commissioners has standing to initiate action against Colorado department of social services because it is seeking judicial review on its own behalf, as distinct from its role as the county board of social services, for an alleged injury it has suffered. Under these circumstances, board is not subordinate to the department. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Romer, 931 P.2d 504 (Colo. App. 1996).

The state board for community colleges and occupational education is by definition a state agency, not a "person" under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, and no action for damages may be maintained against it under that statute. Nat'l Camera, Inc. v. Sanchez, 832 P.2d 960 (Colo. App. 1991).

State department of personnel and its director were not "persons" and lacked standing to seek judicial review of state personnel board's action in questioning part of decision made by department and director. State of Colo. v. Colo. State Pers. Bd., 722 P.2d 1012 (Colo. 1986).

Division of labor's requirement that self-insured employers use payroll statement to calculate the tax owed amounted to a "rule" as defined in subsection (15). Jefferson Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Division of Labor, 791 P.2d 1217 (Colo. App. 1990).

Agency actions often invoke both rule-making and adjudicatory authority, but generally, agency proceedings that primarily seek to or in effect determine policies or standards of general applicability are rule-making proceedings. Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991).

Determining whether a proceeding constitutes rule-making requires careful analysis of the actual conduct and effect of the proceedings and a determination of the purpose for which the proceedings were called. Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991).

The mere fact that a particular proceeding may have collateral prospective effects on other similarly situated parties does not convert an adjudication into rule-making. Trans Shuttle, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 89 P.3d 398 (Colo. 2004).

Although the decision of the public utilities commission appeared as a classification of a single utility's services, it in effect established the standards and policies applicable to telecommunications services of all public utilities. The proceeding which resulted in the ruling was therefore a rule-making proceeding, subject to the APA requirements for rule-making proceedings. Colo. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 816 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1991); Avicomm, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 955 P.2d 1023 (Colo. 1998).

It is within the discretion of the administrative law judge to decide, prior to issuing a decision which constitutes the final agency action in a particular matter, when that decision will become effective. Bethesda Found. v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 877 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1994).

Secretary of state's notice informing games of chance suppliers and manufacturers of fee assessment and reporting requirement was equivalent to an order and therefore amounted to an agency "action" under subsection (1). Bingo Games Supply Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 895 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1995).

Colorado water quality control division's failure to act on a request for a temporary water discharge permit within 180 days constituted final agency action, thereby requiring any district court complaint concerning said action to be filed within 30 days after the end of the 180-day period. Roosevelt Tunnel, LLC v. Norton, 89 P.3d 427 (Colo. App. 2003).

Substance of actions by PUC and not label attached to actions by PUC determines whether PUC has acted in an adjudicatory or rule-making capacity. Home Builders Ass'n v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1986).

Function of supreme court is to review the judgment of trial court, and a question of whether a commission violated administrative rule-making statutory provisions in consideration of a well application is beyond the scope of review. Fundingsland v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 171 Colo. 487, 468 P.2d 835 (1970).

Applied in Colo. State Bd. of Optometric Exam'rs v. Dixon, 165 Colo. 488, 440 P.2d 287 (1968); Colo. Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Dept. of Rev., 618 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1980); Colo. Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 641 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982); Fish v. Charnes, 652 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1982); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cotter Corp., 665 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1983).