Am. Jur.2d. See 47 Am. Jur.2d, Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children, §§ 40-43, 48.

C.J.S. See 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 490; 43 C.J.S., Infants, §§ 6, 7.

Law reviews. For article, "The Denver Juvenile Court", see 5 Den. B. Ass'n Rec. 1 (May, 1928). For article, "The State as Parens Patriae: Juvenile Versus the Divorce Courts on Questions Pertaining to Custody", see 21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 375 (1949). For article, "Workmen's Compensation, Attorneys and Family Law", see 31 Dicta 1 (1954). For note, "Jurisdiction of Custody Matters in Colorado", see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 393 (1956). For note, "Compulsory Medical Care for Infants", see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 235 (1956). For article, "One Year Review of Domestic Relations", see 34 Dicta 108 (1957). For article, "Juvenile Delinquency in Colorado: The Law's Response to Society's Need", see 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 1 (1958). For article, "One Year Review of Domestic Relations", see 35 Dicta 36 (1958). For article, "One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure", see 36 Dicta 34 (1959). For article, "The Adoption of Children in Colorado", see 37 Dicta 100 (1960). For note, "Enforcement of Support Duties in Colorado", see 33 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 70 (1960). For article, "One Year Review of Domestic Relations", see 38 Dicta 84 (1961). For note, "Juvenile Delinquency -- Colorado's Unassumed Burden", see 36 U. Colo. L. Rev. 519 (1964). For article, "One Year Review of Domestic Relations", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 97 (1964). For note, "In re Gault and the Colorado Children's Code", see 44 Den. L.J. 644 (1967). For note, "Delinquency Jurisdiction in Colorado: Garcia and the Children's Code", see 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 80 (1967). For article, "Colorado Felony Sentencing", see 11 Colo. Law. 1478 (1982). For article, "Toward an Integrated Theory of Delinquency Responsibility", see 60 Den. L.J. 485 (1983). For note, "The Expanding Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Charging Juveniles as Adults: A Critical Look at People v. Thorpe", see 54 U. Colo. L. Rev. 617 (1983). For article, "The Expanded Jurisdiction of the Probate Court Under In re J.C.T.", see 37 Colo. Law. 83 (November 2008).

Annotator's note. The following annotations include cases decided under former provisions similar to this section.

The juvenile court is a statutory court with no jurisdiction beyond that expressly given by statute. Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Geisler v. People in Interest of Geisler, 135 Colo. 121, 308 P.2d 1000 (1957); Wellbrink v. Walden, 142 Colo. 102, 349 P.2d 697 (1960); Martinez v. Lopez, 153 Colo. 425, 386 P.2d 595 (1963); People in Interest of L.B., 29 Colo. App. 101, 482 P.2d 1010 (1970), aff'd, 179 Colo. 11, 498 P.2d 1157 (1972), appeal dismissed mem., 410 U.S. 976, 93 S. Ct. 1497, 36 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1973); Pueblo County Comm'rs v. Dist. Court, 708 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1985).

Purpose is to secure uniform administration. Jurisdiction vested in the court of the county where the child resides provides uniform administration of the law and uniform protection of all children in the county. Geisler v. People in Interest of Geisler, 135 Colo. 121, 308 P.2d 1000 (1957).

The juvenile court being a creature of statute is limited by the provisions of the statute creating it and defining its jurisdiction. Kearney v. Blue, 134 Colo. 217, 301 P.2d 515 (1956).

This code intends to grant broad jurisdiction to the juvenile court. Jaramillo v. District Court, 173 Colo. 459, 480 P.2d 841 (1971).

The identification of those authorized to invoke the court's jurisdiction operates to exclude all persons not mentioned. Where this section specifically identifies the officers or persons who may invoke the jurisdiction of a court in a proceeding which is purely statutory, it is necessary and essential that the persons thus named shall institute the proceedings. Avery v. County Court, 126 Colo. 421, 250 P.2d 122 (1952).

General rule. Jurisdiction attaches only in proceedings brought, not in behalf of any person, but solely where children are found delinquent or have been so circumstanced, neglected, or imposed upon as to require the state to take over their custody or act otherwise for their protection. Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Carrera v. Kelley, 131 Colo. 421, 283 P.2d 162 (1955); Geisler v. People in Interest of Geisler, 135 Colo. 121, 308 P.2d 1000 (1957); Wellbrink v. Walden, 142 Colo. 102, 349 P.2d 697 (1960); Martinez v. Lopez, 153 Colo. 425, 386 P.2d 595 (1963).

The status of being a neglected or dependent child triggers juvenile court jurisdiction over a child so circumstanced in Colorado. People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625 (Colo. 1982).

Allocation of juvenile and district court jurisdiction in criminal proceedings. Once an indictment charging a class 1 felony is filed, the jurisdiction of the district court is expressly fixed under subsection (4)(b)(I), and that jurisdiction is not lost simply because the juvenile defendant is convicted of a lesser offense. People v. Davenport, 43 Colo. App. 41, 602 P.2d 871 (1979).

Charges involving a minor should be resolved in adult court when the requirements of the direct filing statute are satisfied as to any charge. People v. Dalton, 70 P.3d 517 (Colo. App. 2002).

Juvenile court lacks exclusive jurisdiction where juvenile charged with municipal ordinance violation. A juvenile who could have been charged under the general theft statute but is only charged under a municipal shoplifting ordinance carrying no jail sentence is not a delinquent child and the juvenile court does not have sole and exclusive jurisdiction. Wigent v. Shinsato, 43 Colo. App. 83, 601 P.2d 653 (1979).

Juveniles to have same rights as adults in trials for municipal ordinance violations. The juvenile court's assumption of jurisdiction carries with it the same trial duties as to juveniles who have violated municipal ordinances, as a municipal court has to adults who violated the same ordinances. People v. Hight, 198 Colo. 299, 599 P.2d 885 (1979).

The Colorado Children's Code confers on Colorado courts jurisdiction over any child physically present in the state. People in Interest of E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971).

Colorado domicile of a child is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction of Colorado courts over that child. People in Interest of E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971).

Certification of the issue of custody to the juvenile court pursuant to former subsection (5)(a) (now subsection (4)(a)) is mandatory. In re Eckman, 645 P.2d 866 (Colo. App. 1982).

Juvenile court has power and duty to make such determinations as it deems appropriate regarding custody and care of a child adjudicated to be within its exclusive jurisdiction. City & County of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157, 511 P.2d 898 (1973).

But department of welfare does not. Given the broad power of the juvenile court to make determinations as to the custody and care of a child under its jurisdiction, it would be inconsistent and contrary to the intent of the general assembly to also find such a power in the Denver department of welfare. City & County of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157, 511 P.2d 898 (1973).

Juvenile court may delegate responsibility for placement of child. City & County of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157, 511 P.2d 898 (1973).

And department of welfare is agent of court subject to court's further authority. The court is vested with the ultimate responsibility in the placement of a child for adoption, and thus, whatever authority the welfare department may have concerning custody and/or placement arises as a result of a delegation of that authority by the court. In essence, therefore, the department acts as the agent of the court, assisting in the fulfillment of the court's responsibility. The grant to the welfare department of custody and authority to place for adoption is thus subject to revocation, limitation, or control by the court delegating such authority. People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

In evaluating the child's best interests, the probate court did not exceed its jurisdiction by directing the GAL to find a permanent guardian or by considering the potential for a future adoption. Nothing in this section deprives the district court of the authority to appoint a guardian for a child. In re J.C.T., 176 P.3d 726 (Colo. 2007).

No automatic repeal by § 16-11-309. The general assembly did not automatically intend to repeal the special provision for discretionary sentencing of juveniles, this section, by the enactment of the general mandatory sentencing statute, § 16-11-309. People v. Dist. Court, 196 Colo. 249, 585 P.2d 913 (1978).

Testimony as to age is prima facie case for jurisdiction. The defendants, by their own testimony that they were 17 years old, made a prima facie case as to their juvenility, and it became incumbent upon the prosecutor to either prove that the defendants were 18 or older or to ask that the case be remanded to the juvenile court for transfer proceeding under the Colorado Children's Code. Maddox v. People, 178 Colo. 366, 497 P.2d 1263 (1972).

Waiver of juvenile court's jurisdiction, after a transfer hearing, will not be set aside unless the findings upon which the waiver was based were erroneous. People in Interest of G.A.T., 183 Colo. 111, 515 P.2d 104 (1973).

Jurisdiction to order placement of juvenile in private facilities. Courts have the jurisdiction to enter custodial orders placing a juvenile in private facilities and directing that the appropriate county department of social services pay the cost of such private treatment. Heim v. Dist. Court, 195 Colo. 107, 575 P.2d 850 (1978).

While subsection (1) generally provides exclusive jurisdiction in the juvenile court over the actions enumerated therein, the clause "except as otherwise provided by law," is an express limitation on such jurisdiction. In re De La Cruz, 791 P.2d 1254 (Colo. App. 1990).

Applied in People v. Dist. Court, 191 Colo. 298, 552 P.2d 297 (1976); People v. Maynes, 193 Colo. 111, 562 P.2d 756 (1977); Ford v. Ford, 194 Colo. 134, 571 P.2d 717 (1977); People in Interest of P.D., 41 Colo. App. 109, 580 P.2d 836 (1978); People v. Dist. Court, 199 Colo. 197, 606 P.2d 450 (1980); People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583 (Colo. 1981); May v. People, 636 P.2d 672 (Colo. 1981); People in Interest of D.L.R., 638 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1981); People v. M.A.W., 651 P.2d 433 (Colo. App. 1982); City & County of Denver v. Dist. Court, 675 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1984); People v. Cunningham, 678 P.2d 1058 (Colo. App. 1983); Rocha v. People, 713 P.2d 350 (Colo. 1986).

Child may be prosecuted directly for traffic violation. One under 18 who violates a traffic law is not a delinquent child, and is therefore not subject to the original exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court in delinquency proceedings, and may be directly prosecuted for a violation of a state traffic law. I.R. v. People, 171 Colo. 54, 464 P.2d 296 (1970).

However, the Colorado Children's Code contains no limitation on the authority of the juvenile court to consider traffic charges when coupled with other misdemeanor or felony charges committed as a part of the same act or series of acts and thus charges are subject to the compulsory joinder statute, § 18-1-408 (2). Marquez v. County Court, 719 P.2d 737 (Colo. App. 1986).

County court may sentence minor to jail term for traffic offense. When a minor is convicted of a traffic offense in a county court which has jurisdiction over that minor, the Colorado Children's Code does not prohibit the court from sentencing the minor to serve a term in the county jail. Villareal v. Lopez, 44 Colo. App. 555, 619 P.2d 86 (1980).

The remedy in case of an abandoned and neglected child rests exclusively in a juvenile court as provided in this section. Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119, 322 P.2d 99 (1958).

Juvenile courts are authorized to determine the question of dependency, and, if found, to determine who is responsible therefor, and to enforce their findings by judgment and execution. Ortega v. Portales, 134 Colo. 537, 307 P.2d 193 (1957); Martinez v. Lopez, 153 Colo. 425, 386 P.2d 595 (1963).

Jurisdiction proper where child abandoned to care of relatives. The assertion that the court lacked jurisdiction over a child because the child was not dependent and neglected is without merit where the child has been abandoned to the care of a grandfather and aunt. People in Interest of F.M., 44 Colo. App. 142, 609 P.2d 1123 (1980).

A juvenile court has no jurisdiction in contests about custody of children, whether it is between parents or other individuals. In re People in Interest of McChesney, 103 Colo. 115, 83 P.2d 772 (1938); Arnett v. Northern, 118 Colo. 307, 194 P.2d 909 (1948); Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953); Kearney v. Blue, 134 Colo. 217, 301 P.2d 515 (1956); Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119, 322 P.2d 99 (1958); Wellbrink v. Walden, 142 Colo. 102, 349 P.2d 697 (1960).

Determination of neglect and dependency can be sought only where immediate needs and welfare of child are in peril, and consequently, they represent situations where the doctrine of parens patriae would be applicable. Such being the case, the trial court properly assumes preliminary jurisdiction over children brought into the state by their mother, but whose custody had been previously awarded to the father by a court in another state, which jurisdiction will become absolute if a valid showing is made by the state of a dependency and neglect situation as defined in the Colorado Children's Code. In re People in Interest of E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971).

Such a dispute is one for determination by a divorce proceeding by which proper jurisdiction of the person and subject matter could be had and all parties properly protected. Kearney v. Blue, 134 Colo. 217, 301 P.2d 515 (1956).

But district court jurisdiction suspended when state brings dependency proceeding. A district court's jurisdiction to dispose of the custody of a child as between the parties to a divorce proceeding and as ancillary to that proceeding, is suspended by the institution of and during the pendency of a direct proceeding in dependency by the state in the interest of the child in a county court under this section. People ex rel. Lucke v. County Court, 109 Colo. 447, 126 P.2d 334 (1942).

The jurisdiction of a divorce court is exercised as between a husband and wife; that of a juvenile court in dependency proceedings, as between the state in the interest of the child, and the parents of the child. The two courts may have simultaneous, though not concurrent, jurisdiction concerning the custody of a child. But where both courts make orders concerning such custody, the operation of the order of the divorce court is suspended during the period, and only during the period, that the order of the juvenile court remains in force. Ross v. Ross, 89 Colo. 536, 5 P.2d 246 (1931); Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119, 322 P.2d 99 (1958).

District court exceeded its statutory jurisdiction by ordering that defendant not have custody of her children as a condition of probation for the crime of criminally negligent child abuse resulting in death. Subsection (1) grants the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legal custody of any child who is dependent or neglected. People v. Forsythe, 43 P.3d 652 (Colo. App. 2001).

Once a petition for custody under § 14-10-123 is certified to be determined as part of a pending dependency and neglect action pursuant to this section, dissolution of marriage statutes cease to apply. Instead, provisions of the Colorado Children's Code govern, in view of the differing policies behind the respective statutes. People in Interest of D.C., 851 P.2d 291 (Colo. App. 1993); People in Interest of A.A.G., 902 P.2d 437 (Colo. App. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 912 P.2d 1385 (Colo. 1996).

District court on habeas corpus has no jurisdiction over abandonment. A district court in habeas corpus proceedings has jurisdiction to determine whether a child is being unlawfully restrained by the grandparents. Such determination cannot in any manner affect the outcome of any adoption proceedings. An adjudication in the habeas corpus proceedings cannot be considered as an adjudication of abandonment as defined in the adoption provisions or as used in the dependent and neglected children provisions, as the question of abandonment is not an issue and the district court has no jurisdiction over abandonment. Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119, 322 P.2d 99 (1958).

In view of the state's strong interest in providing for the welfare of children within its borders, the presence of an allegedly dependent or neglected child within Colorado will generally provide an adequate jurisdictional basis to adjudicate the dependency status of the child within Colorado. E.P. v. Dist. Court, 696 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1985).

The trial court properly assumes preliminary jurisdiction over children brought into the state by their mother, but whose custody had been previously awarded to the father by a court in another state, which jurisdiction will become absolute if a valid showing is made by the state of a dependency and neglect situation as defined in the Colorado Children's Code. People in Interest of E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971).

An action in dependency may not be used as a means of making a child available for adoption in a stepparent adoption proceeding. Such tactic is inappropriate and contrary to the statutory language as well as the legislative intent of the Colorado Children's Code. People in Interest of S.S.T., 38 Colo. App. 110, 553 P.2d 82 (1976).

Judgment reversed for lack of jurisdiction. Cullen v. People ex rel. Baer, 152 Colo. 531, 383 P.2d 316 (1963).

Statute as basis of jurisdiction. Johnson v. People, 170 Colo. 137, 459 P.2d 579 (1969).

Applied in Peterson v. Schwartzmann, 116 Colo. 235, 179 P.2d 662 (1947); People in Interest of Unborn Child v. Estergard, 169 Colo. 445, 457 P.2d 698 (1969).

This section confers jurisdiction on the juvenile court to determine parentage. Dikeou v. People, 95 Colo. 537, 38 P.2d 772 (1934); In re Morrow's Estate, 100 Colo. 424, 68 P.2d 36 (1937).

The courts should primarily be more concerned about the welfare of the child than in the residential status of the parties to the proceeding. No unreasonable impediment should be allowed which would prevent an expectant mother from pursuing the father of the unborn child and invoking the aid of a court having proper jurisdiction at the residence or domicile of the neglectful father if in this state. Campbell v. Gilliam, 127 Colo. 471, 257 P.2d 965 (1953).

The juvenile court has jurisdiction to determine the parentage of children yet unborn. Cederquist v. Archuleta, 127 Colo. 41, 253 P.2d 431 (1953); People in Interest of Unborn Child v. Estergard, 169 Colo. 445, 457 P.2d 698 (1969).

Department's authority in adoption. Inasmuch as the general assembly has granted the court exclusive jurisdiction over adoptions, has expressly authorized adoptive placement, and has given the court the final and sole responsibility of approving or disapproving adoptions, it would be totally inconsistent to conclude that the welfare department or licensed placement agencies are the sole entities authorized to place a child for adoption following termination of parental rights. People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

Court's adoption authority not limited by former § 19-3-111 (2)(b). Subsection (1)(h) expressly provides that the court has exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to the adoption of any person. No limitation on that authority arises by virtue of former § 19-3-111 (2)(b). People in Interest of M.D.C.M., 34 Colo. App. 91, 522 P.2d 1234 (1974).

District court had jurisdiction to rule on nullification of adoption where issues regarding legal custody and adoption of child were incidental to determination of issues presented in dissolution proceeding and no petition was filed in juvenile court. In re Dickson, 983 P.2d 44 (Colo. App. 1998).

Limit on jurisdiction for interstate adoptions. The Interstate Compact on Placement of Children limits the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for interstate adoptions as an exception "otherwise provided by law". Denver Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Dist. Court, 742 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1987).

Under article V of such compact, the sending agency retains jurisdiction until the child is adopted, and the mere filing of an adoption petition is not sufficient to divest the sending agency of jurisdiction. Denver Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Dist. Court, 742 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1987).

General rule whereby Colorado courts must respect custodial decrees of other states is subject to two exceptions: (1) When the domicile of the child subject to a foreign decree changes to Colorado and there is a showing of a change in circumstances after the foreign decree; and (2) when conditions necessitate Colorado's intervention for the protection of any child found within its borders, through the doctrine of parens patriae. Thus, the requirement that a child need only be physically present within the state of Colorado does no violence to the rules governing interstate recognition of custodial decrees. People in Interest of E.F.C., 30 Colo. App. 190, 490 P.2d 706 (1971).

Court without power to proceed if prescribed residence lacking. Where a statute makes the residence of a petitioner within a particular county a condition upon which the jurisdiction of a court can be invoked, a court is wholly without power or authority to proceed in a statutory action unless the petitioner is a resident of such county within which the action is brought. Avery v. County Court, 126 Colo. 421, 250 P.2d 122 (1952).

Jurisdiction not divested when children move from county. The paternity action having been properly commenced in Denver as the statute provided, jurisdiction attached, and the court is not divested of it thereafter by reason of the fact that the children move out of the county. Del Campo v. People in Interest of Del Campo, 172 Colo. 277, 472 P.2d 130 (1970).

A prima facie case of sufficient residency, and also of dependency, established. Campbell v. Gilliam, 127 Colo. 471, 257 P.2d 965 (1953).

A parent may make necessary arrangements for the care of a child without order of court, guardianship or otherwise. It is not the law that before a child can be placed by a parent in temporary custody of a relative permission must be first obtained from the court. Diernfeld v. People in Interest of Diernfeld, 137 Colo. 238, 323 P.2d 628 (1958).

Attainment of majority while minor's appeal from adjudication as "child in need of supervision" is pending renders appeal moot in light of the Colorado Children's Code attempt to eliminate collateral legal consequences of adjudication. People v. T.B., 183 Colo. 310, 516 P.2d 642 (1973).

Jurisdiction to order department of welfare to return child to group care facility. The juvenile court did not exceed its jurisdiction, or lack jurisdiction, to order the Denver department of welfare to return a child who was adjudicated in need of supervision to a group care facility. City & County of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157, 511 P.2d 898 (1973).

The provisions of the Parental Notification Act, §§ 12-37.5-101 to 12-37.5-108, supersede subsection (3) with regard to the provision of notice to parents about abortions. Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountains Servs. Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910 (10th Cir. 2002).

As a result, the Parental Notification Act must be held unconstitutional because it lacks a health exception to the parental notification requirement. Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountains Servs. Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910 (10th Cir. 2002).

Removal of extraordinary life-sustaining devices. A juvenile court has jurisdiction in a shelter hearing to order the removal of all extraordinary life-sustaining devices from a child in the temporary custody of the department of social services if in the doctor's opinion the legal standard of cerebral death has been met. Lovato v. Dist. Court, 198 Colo. 419, 601 P.2d 1072 (1979).

Juvenile may not be compelled to undergo psychological evaluation under subsection (3), for purposes of a transfer hearing, because of his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. People in Interest of A.D.G., 895 P.2d 1067 (Colo. App. 1994).

Juvenile's refusal to undergo psychological evaluation may not be used against him in a transfer hearing because it would impermissibly penalize his exercise of the fifth amendment right. People in Interest of A.D.G., 895 P.2d 1067 (Colo. App. 1994).

Applied in In re U.M. v. Dist. Court, 631 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1981).