In deciding whether to entertain a child custody proceeding, the court shall conduct a two-pronged inquiry. It must first be determined whether jurisdiction exists in this state and if so, then whether jurisdiction should be exercised. Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986); In re Nielsen, 782 P.2d 868 (Colo. 1989). |
||||
Instances giving rise to subject matter jurisdiction. The uniform act attempts to limit custody determination jurisdiction to only one state. Thus, this section confines subject matter jurisdiction to: (a) The home state of at least one parent, and of the child for the last six months; or (b) the state where there are other strong contacts with the child and his family and it is in the child's best interest; or (c) the state where the child is present if the child has been abandoned, or if there is an emergency case of child neglect; or (d) the state of the forum if it is in the child's best interest and no other state could or would assume jurisdiction. In re Glass, 36 Colo. App. 91, 537 P.2d 1092 (1975). |
||||
Court had jurisdiction to modify an existing Oklahoma custody decree based on the home state provision of subsection (1)(a) where the child resided in Colorado for thirteen months before the alleged incident of sexual molestation by the child's father. People in Interest of K.G., 876 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1993). |
||||
Two-step analysis. Where Colorado has jurisdiction as a matter of law, the court must then determine whether its jurisdiction is exclusive or nonexclusive, and, if nonexclusive, the court must determine whether or not it should defer to another state's jurisdiction. Lynch v. Lynch, 770 P.2d 1383 (Colo. App. 1989); People in Interest of K.G., 876 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1993); L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1995). |
||||
Serving best interests of children where parents are located in separate jurisdictions. The best interests of children who are subjects of contested custody where the parents are located in separate jurisdictions are served when the forum determining custody has a significant connection and optimum access to relevant evidence about them. Wheeler v. District Court, 186 Colo. 218, 526 P.2d 658 (1974). |
||||
Jurisdictional considerations under subsection (1)(b) are governed by the best interest of the child and by the child's connections to the prospective forum state rather than the best interests of the feuding parties or the parties' connections to a prospective forum state. Nistico v. District Court, 791 P.2d 1128 (Colo. 1990). |
||||
The trial court had jurisdiction even though the mother had abducted the child, because this article provides that unclean hands do not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. Nelson v. District Court, 186 Colo. 381, 527 P.2d 811 (1974). |
||||
Improper retention of the child should affect only the court's decision to exercise its jurisdiction. Nelson v. District Court, 186 Colo. 381, 527 P.2d 811 (1974). |
||||
Exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction under subsection (1)(c) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances. In re Glass, 36 Colo. App. 91, 537 P.2d 1092 (1975); Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986). |
||||
Jurisdiction when domicile changes. Under subsection (1)(a), where mother and child have moved to another state after a dissolution of marriage proceeding in a court of this state, jurisdiction over issues of child custody is with the state that is the home state of the child at the commencement of the custody proceeding then pending before the court. Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986). |
||||
Where the child lived in Michigan during the six-month period preceding the filing of the father's motion of schedule visitation, Colorado does not have home state jurisdiction under subsection (1)(a). Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986). |
||||
Loss of jurisdiction of original state. While the intent of the uniform act is that the original state shall have continuing jurisdiction under § 14-13-115, such jurisdiction can be lost by the erosion of a child's and parents' significant connections with the state. McCarron v. District Court ex rel. County of Jefferson, 671 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1983); Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986). |
||||
No authority to modify unless other court without jurisdiction. A Colorado court is not authorized to modify an existing custody decree from another state even in an emergency unless the court which rendered that decree no longer has, or has declined to assume, jurisdiction of the matter. In re Thomas, 36 Colo. App. 96, 537 P.2d 1095 (1975). |
||||
Modification authorized where Colorado is home state. When Colorado is the home state of the children, Colorado has the jurisdiction to modify a sister state's decree in the best interests of the children. Kudler v. Smith, 643 P.2d 783 (Colo. App. 1981). |
||||
State court had jurisdiction. Where all of the individuals who had an interest in the child's future care, well-being, and custody were either domiciled in Colorado or sought to enforce their legal rights by way of habeas corpus or permanent custody petitions in the courts of Colorado, and sufficient evidence was available in Colorado from which the trial court could have concluded that the Colorado court could best resolve the issues relating to the child's future care and training, the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the issues raised in a petition for permanent custody although the child's domicile was not in Colorado. Nelson v. District Court, 186 Colo. 381, 527 P.2d 811 (1974). |
||||
Trial court properly held that Colorado is child's home state since she maintained significant connections here. Child has lived with her mother and attended school in Colorado for years, and both her guardian ad litem and therapist are here. Furthermore, the California courts in two districts both declined to exercise jurisdiction, which satisfies one of the alternative requirements of former § 14-13-04 (1)(d). In re Dickson, 983 P.2d 44 (Colo. App. 1998) (decided prior to 2000 repeal and reenactment). |
||||
Colorado court had jurisdiction in proceeding brought by children's mother to enforce a custody decree rendered in a sister state, which had originally given custody of the children to the father and had allowed the father to move the children to Colorado, where the children and the father were domiciled in Colorado and the children attended Colorado schools. Wheeler v. District Court, 186 Colo. 218, 526 P.2d 658 (1974). |
||||
Allegations by parents against each other do not justify jurisdiction. Although the allegations of both the father and the mother may indicate that the best interests of the child mandate judicial review of the fitness of each parent to have custody of the child, that does not necessarily justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this state. Roberts v. District Court, 198 Colo. 79, 596 P.2d 65 (1979). |
||||
Jurisdiction to modify foreign visitation order. A modification of visitation rights is a "custody determination" under § 14-13-103(2), and so, pursuant to this section, where a child and his parents have been living in this state for over a year, a trial court of this state has the jurisdiction to modify a foreign child visitation order. In re Bechard, 40 Colo. App. 516, 577 P.2d 778 (1978). |
||||
Foreign state without jurisdiction. Foreign state court which originally granted temporary custody to the petitioner, a paternal aunt, has lost jurisdiction since the residence of the parties in the foreign state was premised solely on a military assignment, and both the father and the mother have returned to the site of their domicile -- Denver, Colorado -- and the child's natural father, mother, and grandparents are all residents of Colorado and have significant connections to Colorado. Nelson v. Schweitzer, 189 Colo. 511, 542 P.2d 382 (1975). |
||||
Court lacked basis to grant noncustodial parent temporary custody of wrongfully retained minor child. Where no compelling reason exists for the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction, and the child has been retained in this state by the noncustodial parent after the term of visitation has expired, the court has no basis in fact or law to grant the noncustodial parent temporary custody of the minor child. Brock v. District Court, 620 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1980). |
||||
Colorado without jurisdiction. Where, on the date father filed his complaint in Colorado, all significant connections of child and mother were with Kansas and child's contacts with Colorado were minimal, Kansas had jurisdiction to make a custody determination. Hence, pursuant to § 14-13-115 (1), the Colorado court could not modify the existing Kansas custody decree. In re Thomas, 36 Colo. App. 96, 537 P.2d 1095 (1975). |
||||
To interpret § 14-13-115 as a prohibition against a Colorado court's exercise of jurisdiction to enter temporary and protective custody orders in order to protect children endangered by their surroundings would, in effect, vitiate the very purpose of the parens patriae jurisdiction granted by this section. E.P. v. District Court, 696 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1985). |
||||
Where on the date the Colorado petition for permanent custody of a child was filed by the father, a Colorado resident, in Colorado, and the uniform act was operable in California, and on that date, the mother was still a domiciliary of California, the child's home state under the uniform act was and is California, and, for all but the last three months before the petition was filed, the child lived with his mother and grandparents in California and had only minimal contacts with Colorado, therefore, California had jurisdiction to make a custody determination under the uniform act. Hence, by virtue of § 14-13-115(1), the Colorado court could not modify the existing California custody decree. In re Glass, 36 Colo. App. 91, 537 P.2d 1092 (1975). |
||||
A parent's self-serving statements that his child appeared unwell are not enough to confer jurisdiction, under subdivision (1)(c), on a district court in this state while a foreign court has continuing jurisdiction over the child. Woodhouse v. District Court, 196 Colo. 558, 587 P.2d 1199 (1978). |
||||
In a continuing custody dispute where none of the parties still live in Colorado, the fact that any proceedings related to custody inherently arise from an initial custody order, which was made by Colorado courts, does not necessarily give Colorado continuing jurisdictional authority. In re Pritchett, 80 P.3d 918 (Colo. App. 2003). |
||||
Under the uniform act, the Colorado court was without jurisdiction to resolve a second contempt proceeding once it had relinquished jurisdiction over all matters except the first contempt proceeding, and the North Dakota court was properly exercising jurisdiction. In re Pritchett, 80 P.3d 918 (Colo. App. 2003). |
||||
"The time of commencement of the proceeding" means the pending motion affecting custody or visitation rather than the initial dissolution action which resulted in the rendition of the custody decree. Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1986). |
||||
Declining jurisdiction over controversy held not error. Garcia v. Martinez, 642 P.2d 53 (Colo. App. 1982). |
||||
Where both states had jurisdiction over child and trial court found that South Carolina was "home state" of child, trial court did not err in declining to exercise continuing jurisdiction. People in Interest of S.B., 742 P.2d 935 (Colo. App. 1987), cert. denied, 754 P.2d 1177 (Colo. 1988). |
||||
Under the doctrine of parens patriae, where an emergency existed concerning the immediate needs and welfare of a child within this state, our courts could have in such circumstances, entered custodial orders for the protection of such child, notwithstanding the child's domicile elsewhere and the existence of otherwise valid orders to the contrary theretofore entered in a sister state having jurisdiction of the parties, and such power could have been exercised not only in ordinary custody proceedings, but also in habeas corpus proceedings. Wilson v. Wilson, 172 Colo. 566, 474 P.2d 789 (1970). |
||||
Where the father alleged the existence of an emergency situation which he claimed required the Colorado court to intervene and modify the Kansas divorce decree, under such circumstances, the Colorado court, under its general parens patriae jurisdiction over a child physically present in the state, could properly make a temporary order to protect the child. In re Thomas, 36 Colo. App. 96, 537 P.2d 1095 (1975). |
||||
The forum of the domicile where the parties were known, where the matrimonial difficulties occurred, and where the evidence was available, was most likely to make just decisions of such issues, and it promoted neither justice nor respect for the courts to permit a spouse in prospect of an unfavorable decision to find sanctuary in another jurisdiction where adverse evidence was not available and the other spouse may not be able to appear. Evans v. Evans, 136 Colo. 6, 314 P.2d 291 (1957); Petition of Kraudel v. Benner, 148 Colo. 525, 366 P.2d 667 (1961). |
||||
The courts of this state had jurisdiction, in a proper case, to hear all relevant testimony offered by either party in regard to the custody of a minor child domiciled in this state, and enter such judgment as would have been for the best interests of the minor, even though the judgment be different from that entered by a sister state, where it was shown to the courts of this state that the condition of the parties had so changed since the entry of the judgment by the sister state that the welfare of the minor required that the courts of this state hear and determine the question presented. Evans v. Evans, 136 Colo. 6, 314 P.2d 291 (1957); Petition of Kraudel v. Benner, 148 Colo. 525, 366 P.2d 667 (1961). |
||||
State exercising jurisdiction under the uniform act should be state with closest connection to the child and the child's family and with access to the maximum amount of evidence concerning the child's residence. L.G. v. People, 890 P.2d 647 (Colo. 1995). |
||||
After a final decree in divorce, either party could change domicile at will, and the child's domicile then changed with that of the parent in whose custody he had been placed and the court of new domicile had jurisdiction over proceedings as to custody. Evans v. Evans, 136 Colo. 6, 314 P.2d 291 (1957). |
||||
After a change of domicile it was held that any modification of the provisions of the final decree as to custody by the court of the former domicile was without extraterritorial effect in Colorado. Evans v. Evans, 136 Colo. 6, 314 P.2d 291 (1957). |
||||
Award of custody by a court having jurisdiction should be recognized by other states and the facts upon which the award is based held res judicata. Evans v. Evans, 136 Colo. 6, 314 P.2d 291 (1957); Petition of Kraudel v. Benner, 148 Colo. 525, 366 P.2d 667 (1961); Wilson v. Wilson, 172 Colo. 566, 474 P.2d 789 (1970). |
||||
Where the primary and controlling issue was the welfare of the child, and that issue was considered and determined by the court of another state, it could not and should not have been readjudicated in Colorado. Evans v. Evans, 136 Colo. 6, 314 P.2d 291 (1957). |
||||
While the custody issue may be decided in another state, there is no legal basis for a trial court to defer to another state on issues of maintenance and child support. In re Doria, 855 P.2d 28 (Colo. App. 1993). |
||||
Colorado courts do not have jurisdiction in case in which child was born in California and continued to reside there. The record suggests that California, not Colorado, is the state containing substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships. Nistico v. District Court, 791 P.2d 1128 (Colo. 1990). |
||||
The district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising jurisdiction, even though it did not make findings as to the basis for its exercise of jurisdiction, where Colorado had jurisdiction based on the home state provision of the act and Oklahoma met none of the criteria outlined in either the Colorado or the substantially similar Oklahoma jurisdictional prerequisite provisions. People in Interest of K.G., 876 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1993). |
||||
Even though Colorado both had jurisdiction and could have exercised that jurisdiction under the act to modify an Oklahoma custody decree, under the federal parental kidnapping prevention act of 1980, the Colorado court was required to decline jurisdiction in favor of Oklahoma because Oklahoma was the state of the original custody determination and, therefore, had continuing jurisdiction under Oklahoma law since the father remained a resident of Oklahoma and he had exercised his visitation rights in Oklahoma. Therefore, the portion of the Colorado court's judgment that modified mother's custody and father's visitation rights under the Oklahoma custody determination could not stand. People in Interest of K.G., 876 P.2d 1 (Colo. App. 1993). |
||||
Foreign custody decree could be modified by a Colorado court where the decree has been docketed in Colorado and Colorado is now the home state of the children. In re Whitley, 775 P.2d 95 (Colo. App. 1989). |
||||
Colorado court must enforce jurisdictionally deficient Nebraska custody order despite the fact that Nebraska's finding of jurisdiction was based upon the erroneous premise that Colorado had declined to exercise its home-state jurisdiction on convenience grounds. The Nebraska court based its determination of jurisdiction on a ground recognized by the PKPA and UCCJEA and provided at least a colorable basis for its finding after a hearing in which the mother participated. Enforceability of another state's custody order under the PKPA, UCCJEA, and the full faith and credit clause does not turn on whether the other state correctly decided its own jurisdiction. However, to avoid injustice to the child who has lived most of her life in Colorado, the Colorado court shall communicate with the Nebraska court pursuant to § 14-13-110 to seek the Nebraska court's reconsideration of its jurisdictional and substantive orders. In re L.S., 226 P.3d 1227 (Colo. App. 2009). |
||||
When the parties to a divorce remarry each other, the court's jurisdiction over the parties is terminated and the provisions of the prior decree for matters of child support, custody, and maintenance are nullified. In re Doria, 855 P.2d 28 (Colo. App. 1993). |
||||
Applied in Zumbrun v. Zumbrun, 42 Colo. App. 37, 592 P.2d 16 (1978); In re Tricamo, 42 Colo. App. 493, 599 P.2d 273 (1979); Lopez v. District Court, 199 Colo. 207, 606 P.2d 853 (1980); In re Severn, 44 Colo. App. 109, 608 P.2d 381 (1980); In re Johnson, 634 P.2d 1034 (Colo. App. 1981); In re Tatum, 653 P.2d 74 (Colo. App. 1982); Bakke v. District Court, 719 P.2d 313 (Colo. 1986); In re Tonnessen, 937 P.2d 863 (Colo. App. 1996). |
||||