(f) In a proceeding under this article, a tribunal of this state shall permit a party or witness residing in another state to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means at a designated tribunal or other location in that state. A tribunal of this state shall cooperate with tribunals of other states in designating an appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.

(g) If a party called to testify at a civil hearing refuses to answer on the ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from the refusal.

(h) A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses does not apply in a proceeding under this article.

(i) The defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife or parent and child does not apply in a proceeding under this article.

(j) A voluntary acknowledgment of paternity, certified as a true copy, is admissible to establish parentage of the child.

Source: L. 93: Entire article R&RE, p. 1593, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 2003: (a), (b), (e), and (f) amended and (j) added, p. 1254, § 23, effective July 1, 2004.

Editor's note: This section was contained in an article that was repealed and reenacted in 1993. Provisions of this section, as it existed in 1993, are similar to those contained in 14-5-121 and 14-5-124 as said sections existed in 1992, the year prior to the repeal and reenactment of this article.

Cross references: For privileged evidence of husband and wife generally, see §§ 13-90-107 and 13-90-108.

Annotator's note: Since § 14-5-316 is similar to §§ 14-5-121 and 14-5-124 as they existed prior to the 1993 repeal and reenactment of this article, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

Full faith and credit must be given to another state's final order for arrearages entered under RURESA, § 14-5-101 et seq. In re Sabala, 802 P.2d 1163 (Colo. App. 1990).

Child support installment under California decree became an enforceable judgment in Colorado where husband made support payments in amounts less than the amount ordered by such decree. In re Barone, 895 P.2d 1075 (Colo. App. 1994).

The doctrine of equitable estoppel may properly be applied to afford relief from accrued arrearages in child support if the party asserting the claim demonstrates reasonable reliance, to the party's detriment, upon the acts or representations of the other person, and lack of knowledge or convenient means of knowing the facts. In re Dennin and Lohf, 811 P.2d 449 (Colo. App. 1991).

Eventual and belated compliance with a prior support order may be a defense to an action, but each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Jackson v. Jackson, 157 Colo. 564, 404 P.2d 281 (1965).

It may be a defense if the trial court chooses not to enter an order under the action brought pursuant to the uniform act. Jackson v. Jackson, 157 Colo. 564, 404 P.2d 281 (1965).

Where denial of continuance not prejudicial. Where the trial court has before it the affidavits filed in the initiating state, as well as the deposition of the absent obligee, and the obligor has declined the court's offer to provide a subpoena duces tecum in conjunction with letters rogatory so the obligor could obtain financial documents from the obligee, there is no prejudice resulting from the trial court's denial of the obligor's request for a continuance. Rohrer v. Kane, 44 Colo. App. 85, 609 P.2d 1121 (1980).

Child's right to support is unaffected by misconduct of his parents, and when a court conditions the disbursement of child support payments upon the custodial parent's complying with visitation orders, the court errs as a matter of law. People ex rel. Meveren v. District Court, 638 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1982).

Applied in Dewar v. LeNard, 653 P.2d 82 (Colo. App. 1982).