8-70-102. Legislative declaration.

As a guide to the interpretation and application of this article, the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the general assembly to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The general assembly, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this state require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the state, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.

Source: L. 36, 3rd Ex. Sess.: p. 13, § 2. CSA: C. 167A, § 2. L. 41: p. 761, § 2. CRS 53: § 82-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 82-1-2.

C.J.S. See 81 C.J.S., Social Security and Public Welfare, § 147.

Law reviews. For article, "Unemployment Insurance in Colorado -- Eligibility and Disqualification", see 25 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 180 (1953). For note, "The Unemployment Compensation Recipient -- Should He Accept a Job?", see 44 Den. L.J. 147 (1967).

This act was passed to achieve social security for labor. Park Floral Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 104 Colo. 350, 91 P.2d 492 (1939).

It is clear from the declaration of policy that this act was enacted to avoid economic insecurity resulting from involuntary unemployment. Harding v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973).

This section sets forth guidelines for the "interpretation and application" of the employment security act. This statement is a constituent part of the act. Sandoval v. Indus. Comm'n, 110 Colo. 108, 130 P.2d 930 (1942); Indus. Comm'n v. Lyle Adjustment Co., 160 Colo. 241, 417 P.2d 5 (1966).

And unemployment compensation acts are to be liberally construed to further their remedial and beneficent purposes. Indus. Comm'n v. Sirokman, 134 Colo. 481, 306 P.2d 669 (1957); Tague v. Coors Porcelain Co., 30 Colo. App. 158, 490 P.2d 96 (1971).

The employment security act must be construed liberally in favor of the claimant when possible. Denver Symphony Ass'n v. Indus. Comm'n, 34 Colo. App. 343, 526 P.2d 685 (1974).

This act has its legal basis in the police power of the state. Its purpose is to assure a measure of security against the great hazard of unemployment in our economic life. Indus. Comm'n v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P.2d 560 (1939).

For unemployment compensation is a matter related to the public welfare so as to authorize the general assembly, in the exercise of the police powers, to enact a law authorizing payment of benefits to unemployed persons and levying a tax on employers to defray the cost thereof. Cottrell Clothing Co. v. Teets, 139 Colo. 558, 342 P.2d 1016 (1959).

And the policy of the employment security act is to provide some protection to those persons unemployed through no fault of their own. Richlow Mfg. Co. v. Nicholas, 38 F. Supp. 864 (D. Colo.), rev'd on other grounds, 126 F.2d 16 (10th Cir. 1941); Sandoval v. Indus. Comm'n, 110 Colo. 108, 130 P.2d 930 (1941); Donnell v. Indus. Comm'n, 149 Colo. 228, 368 P.2d 777 (1962); Montaus v. Indus. Comm'n, 171 Colo. 92, 464 P.2d 518 (1970); Gatewood v. Russell, 29 Colo. App. 11, 478 P.2d 679 (1970); Int'l. Typographical Union v. Indus. Comm'n, 44 Colo. App. 29, 609 P.2d 634 (1980); Denver Post Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 677 P.2d 436 (Colo. App. 1984).

Thus the act does not confer benefits upon a partner who voluntarily agrees to dissolve a partnership, receive a distribution of assets, and thereupon voluntarily agrees to relinquish his duties at the business. Indus. Comm'n v. Lyle Adjustment Co., 160 Colo. 241, 417 P.2d 5 (1966).

Purpose of employment security act, as stated in this section, is subverted by § 8-73-108(4)(f)(I) which reads "but a job shall not ... control notwithstanding", because this provision makes an invidious distinction between (1) those who obtain a better job which terminates prior to 90 days because of lack of work with no fault of their own and (2) those who obtain a better job which terminates prior to 90 days because of some other factor other than lack of work with no fault of their own, and such a distinction involves an unconstitutional over classification forbidden by the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution. Spann v. Indus. Comm'n, 181 Colo. 153, 508 P.2d 385 (1973).

Act is independent of federal social security act. This act has an independent basis, and the federal social security act does not place any limitations upon the courts' interpretation or the guide of interpretation contained in the act itself. Indus. Comm'n v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 Colo. 550, 88 P.2d 560 (1939).

Determinations made under employment security act are not binding on the parties under any other statutory or contractual relationship or on any other agency or court. City of Colo. Springs v. Indus. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 601 (Colo. App. 1985), aff'd, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1988).

Applied in Olsgard v. Indus. Comm'n, 190 Colo. 472, 548 P.2d 910 (1976); Pierce v. Indus. Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 85, 553 P.2d 402 (1976).